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Prosocial Fraud
Julia Y. Lee*
This Article identifies the concept of prosocial fraud—that is, fraud
motivated by the desire to help others. The current incentive-based legal
framework focuses on deterring rational bad actors who must be
constrained from acting on their worst impulses. This overlooks a less
sinister, but more endemic species of fraud that is not driven by greed or
the desire to take advantage of others. Prosocial fraud is induced by
prosocial motives and propagated through cooperative norms. This
Article argues that prosocial fraud cannot be effectively deterred through
increased sanctions because its moral ambiguity lends itself to selfdeception and motivated blindness. The presence of a beneficiary other
than the self allows individuals to supplant one source of morality
(honesty), with another (benevolence), providing a powerful source of
rationalization that weakens the deterrent impact of legal sanctions.
After examining the types of motives that typify prosocial fraud, this
Article identifies structural and situational factors—definitional
ambiguity, incrementalism, and third-party complicity—that increase its
prevalence. Given the cognitive and psychological biases at play, this
Article suggests that any efforts to curb prosocially motivated fraud focus
less on adjusting sanctions and more on exploring alternative mechanisms
of ex ante, private enforcement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
How should the law regulate fraud that is prosocially motivated?
Individuals routinely commit—or help others to commit—fraud that is
not in their rational self-interest. Despite the threat of legal sanctions,
fraud has proven to be as ubiquitous as it is intractable. The narrative
is by now a familiar one: revelations of brazen acts of dishonesty and
deception that flourished unchecked for months, if not years. The public
predictably reacts with disgust and condemnation, scornful that others
could be so unethical and morally bankrupt.
The public’s response reflects simplistic assumptions about
fraudulent behavior, assumptions that are deeply embedded in the law.
According to this narrative, individuals commit fraud for two reasons:
(1) a flawed, dishonest character; and (2) greed.1 The sensational,
massive fraud prosecutions of the past century—Bernie Madoff,
Kenneth Lay, Jeffrey Skilling, and Charles Ponzi—personify this bad
1 See, e.g., Alexander Schuchter & Michael Levi, The Fraud Triangle Revisited, 29 SEC.
J. 107, 110 (2016); DAVID E. SARNA, HISTORY OF GREED: FINANCIAL FRAUD FROM TULIP MANIA TO
BERNIE MADOFF 25 (2010); Ann M. Olazabal & Patricia S. Abril, The Ubiquity of Greed: A
Contextual Model for Analysis of Scienter, 60 FLA. L. REV. 401, 403-404 (2008); see
generally CHARLES R. TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE: THE QUESTION OF DETERRENCE
(1980); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1976).
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actor theory of fraud. Under this view, because it is rational for an
individual to cheat while others cooperate, the law must impose
penalties to deter fraud. Optimally, sanctions are set at a level that
aligns individual interests with collective ones, making it rational not to
cheat. A system of informal sanctions—gossip and social ostracism—
complement the formal ones, further increasing the costliness of
defection.
Yet the stubborn persistence of fraud suggests a fundamental
disconnect between theory and practice.
In theory, fear of
imprisonment, combined with hefty fines and the prospect of public
humiliation ought to dissuade all but the most depraved hearts from
engaging in fraud. But while the existing incentive-based framework
may deter the rational, calculative homo economicus, it has failed to curb
fraudulent behavior by those who are more boundedly rational.
Why does fraud proliferate, sometimes for years, in organizations
in which numerous individuals either actively participate or are
complicit through silence? Can it be that individuals simply cannot
control their darker impulses? Or do they just assume they will not get
caught (or simply underestimate the risk of detection)? Recent research
in behavioral ethics has provided new insights on the situational, social,
and emotional forces at work, but the law has not kept pace. Although
the law on fraud is purposefully fluid and amorphous, it is rooted on the
assumption that fraudulent behavior is driven by financial self-interest.
Accordingly, rather than being tailored and responsive, the law on fraud
is prescriptive and aspirational, focused on deterring and sanctioning
rational bad behavior.
Fraud is perhaps the consummate crime against trust. It impugns
an individual’s character, signaling dishonesty, opportunism, and
untrustworthiness. Because fraud is undefined by design, individuals
are left to rely on intuition and a general awareness of social, moral, and
religious proscriptions against lying, cheating, and advantage-taking.
The opacity of the legal standard, however, makes it particularly
susceptible
to
emotional
decision-making,
self-deceptive
rationalizations, and inconsistent enforcement.
Although legal scholars have attempted subject-specific definitions
of fraud,2 the aim of this Article is not to propose more specificity in the
definition of fraud. Rather, it draws on the insights of behavioral ethics
2 See, e.g., Matthew A. Edwards, The Concept and Federal Crime of Mortgage Fraud,
57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 85–90 (2020); Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE
L.J. 511, 520 (2011); Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 746–760
(1999); Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, Criminal Tax Fraud: An Analytical Review, 57 MO.
L. REV. 175, 179–80 (1992).
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to explore the influence of prosocial motives on fraudulent behavior.
The current legal framework is tailored primarily toward the atomistic,
calculative fraudster who is motivated by self-interest. This ignores
broad swaths of fraudulent activity, including morally ambiguous fraud
that is not triggered by the profit motive.
This Article challenges the paradigm of the rational, self-interested
fraudster, focusing instead on one type of non-calculative fraudster—
the prosocial fraudster. Prosocial fraud appears to be a contradiction in
terms: no amount of fraud can be socially beneficial. As used in this
Article, the term references not the effect, but the motive for engaging
in fraud. As opposed to fraud induced by greed, prosocial fraud refers
to fraud induced by prosocial motives and emotions such as altruism,
empathy, loyalty, and love.
Emerging research suggests that prosocial fraud is a far more
prevalent and compelling force than previously recognized, afflicting
small and large cons alike.3 Unlike other species of fraud, however,
reputational sanctions and the impact on trust are attenuated. Where
there is dissonance between legal penalties on the one hand, and social
sanctions and internal values on the other, legal sanctions lose part of
their moral and practical force. Accordingly, the current incentivebased approach, which relies heavily on definitional ambiguity and
prosecutorial discretion to address different species of fraud, is
particularly ill-equipped to deal with prosocial fraud.
This Article argues that the deterrent aims of the current legal
framework cannot be fully achieved without accounting for the
influence of prosocial motives and cooperative norms on fraudulent
behavior. Human behavior is as much influenced by internal motivation
as by external sanctions and social norms. Ideally, legal sanctions, social
sanctions, and intrinsic motivation should work in concert to produce
prosocial behavior. But in the context of prosocial fraud, intrinsic
motivation and social sanctions often undercut the effectiveness of legal
sanctions. This Article explores this inherent tension.
The law imposes liability for failure to behave in prosocial ways,
but the impulse to act prosocially can sometimes have perverse effects.
Prosocial fraud is particularly unresponsive to legal sanctions because
of the interaction of two powerful cognitive biases—self-deception and
motivated blindness. Self-deception undermines the effectiveness of
legal sanctions by providing an alternate source of intrinsic motivation,
while motivated blindness subverts social sanctions. This Article argues

3

See infra Part II.
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that the moral ambiguity of prosocial fraud facilitates self-deceptive
rationalizations that do not respond to increased sanctions.
Part I analyzes the role of intrinsic motivation, arguing that the
impulse to help can often override the impulse to act ethically. It
identifies mechanisms of self-deception and catalogues the types of
prosocial motives that can lead to fraudulent behavior. Part II discusses
certain structural and situational factors—definitional ambiguity,
incrementalism, and third-party complicity—that increase the
prevalence of prosocial fraud. Part III sets out a normative framework
for curbing prosocial fraud through ex ante private enforcement. Parts
I and II highlight the inadequacy of direct deterrence, attempting to
answer the question of why prosocial fraud should be treated
differently. Part III deals with how it can be curtailed, focusing on the
comparative advantages of third-party monitors in disrupting
misconduct.
II. INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
The current doctrinal framework assumes that fraudulent
behavior derives from inherent character flaws, lapses of judgment, and
the weighing of incentives. But a wealth of social science research has
demonstrated that this conception of human behavior is unduly narrow.
In recent years, researchers in psychology, economics, behavioral
ethics, and other disciplines have demonstrated that numerous
psychological mechanisms and processes underlie unethical conduct.
Not only are many bad acts not the product of rational, deliberative
decision-making, but also cognitive biases such as self-deception,
motivated reasoning, and motivated blindness vitiate the impact of legal
and social sanctions.
A. Mechanisms of Self-Deception
Accumulating evidence suggests that individuals’ emotional,
unconscious, and affective states play a far more prevalent role in
unethical behavior than previously thought.4 A combination of explicit
and implicit mental processes impact behavior:5 the mechanistic,
automatic, heuristic, and unconscious system on the one hand (“System
1”), and the deliberative, conscious, evaluative system on the other

See Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing
Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW,
MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74, 75 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005).
5 See id.
4
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(“System 2”).6 Automatic and deliberate processes “often work in
concert to produce judgments and decisions.”7 Under the conventional
view, the impulse to act selfishly is an automatic System 1 process,
whereas the impulse to act ethically is a deliberative System 2 process.8
Experimental evidence suggests that in anonymous settings with little
accountability, individuals tend to lie to advance their self-interests.9
In recent years, behavioral ethicists have demonstrated that
unethical behavior can result from automatic and reflexive processes.10
Individuals make many decisions and take many actions on the basis of
impulse and intuition.11 Many moral judgments result from “quick,
automatic, evaluations” that are justified and rationalized post hoc.12 In
social contexts, people tend not to make calculated utilitarian
judgments, but instead respond intuitively to “up close and personal”
aspects of their environment.13 Individuals often have reflexive feelings
about reciprocity, loyalty, equality, or suffering that are shaped by social
and cultural forces.14 Prosocial impulses—not just self-interest—can
motivate unethical behavior under System 1 automatic processes.
When automatic and controlled judgments conflict, automatic
processing often prevails.15 Moreover, some individuals may act
unethically without full consciousness that they are doing so.16
Researchers have demonstrated how “the illusion of conscious will”
may lead individuals to attribute responsibility and intention to actions
over which they in fact have little or no control.17
6 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011); CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE
GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS 4–5 (2006); see also YUVAL
FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY TO REGULATE HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 2 (2018).
7 See Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the
Psychology of Conflicts of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 189, 192 (2004).
8 Id. at 190.
9 Shaul Shalvi et al., Honesty Requires Time (and Lack of Justifications), 23 PSYCH. SCI.
1264, 1268 (2012); see also EYAL ZAMIR & DORON TEICHMAN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
72 (2018).
10 See ZAMIR & TEICHMAN, supra note 9.
11 See Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 194; Max H. Bazerman & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, The Social Psychology of Ordinary Ethical Failures, 17 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 111, 112
(2004).
12 See Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 194.
13 See J.D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral
Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105, 2106 (2001).
14 See J. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCH. REV. 814, 826 (2001).
15 See Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 192.
16 See MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO WHAT’S
RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 6–12 (2011) [hereinafter BLIND SPOTS].
17 See DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 318 (2017).
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In addition, psychological mechanisms such as motivated
reasoning and self-deception can undermine the deterrent effect of legal
and social sanctions. Motivated reasoning refers to how motivation
affects reasoning by influencing the types of information that
individuals pay attention to and rely on.18 When individuals wish to
arrive at a particular conclusion, they construct justifications for that
conclusion by accessing only a biased subset of relevant information.19
“In other words, one’s preferred course of action provides a directional
motivation to search for, attend to, and weight more heavily any
evidence that supports the preference.”20 Accordingly, people are more
likely to arrive at conclusions they wish to arrive at.21
These findings are consistent with other studies showing that
individuals’ perceptions of their own morality are highly fluid and
pliable, impacting future behavior.22
Individuals manage their
memories to maintain a favorable self-image. Those who have engaged
in dishonesty often engage in “moral forgetting”—unconsciously
forgetting or misremembering actual behavior and moral norms meant
to guide that behavior.23 As Max Bazerman and Ann Tenbrunsel noted,
“[b]ecause we are motivated by a desire to see ourselves as ethical
people, we remember the actions and decisions that were ethical and
forget, or never even process, those that were not, thereby leaving intact
our image of ourselves as ethical.”24 Similarly, “ethical fading” involves
overlooking the ethical dimension of a decision to avoid the moral
implications
of
that
decision.25
Self-deception—“active
misrepresentation of reality to the conscious mind” or “lying to
oneself”—allows individuals to disregard accurate assessments of their
behavior.26 Self-serving justifications allow individuals to act in their

18 See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL. 480, 480
(1990).
19 Id. at 493.
20 Celia Moore & Ann E. Tenbrunsel, “Just Think About It”? Cognitive Complexity and
Moral Choice, 123 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 138, 140 (2014) (citations
omitted).
21 Kunda, supra note 18, at 495.
22 See Jennifer Jordan et al., The Moral Self-Image Scale: Measuring and
Understanding the Malleability of the Moral Self, 6 FRONTIERS PSYCH. 1, 1 (2015).
23 Lisa L. Shu & Francesca Gino, Sweeping Dishonesty Under the Rug: How Unethical
Actions Lead to Forgetting of Moral Rules, 6 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1164, 1164
(2012).
24 BLIND SPOTS, supra note 16, at 58.
25 Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception
in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 223, 224 (2004).
26 Robert Trivers, The Elements of a Scientific Theory of Self-Deception, 907 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCIS. 114, 114 (2000).
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self-interest without feeling or appearing immoral. Similarly, third
parties are more likely to excuse or overlook such behavior.27
B. Motive
This research suggests that assumptions implicit in the legal
system’s treatment of fraud are deeply flawed. The law largely
disregards motive, but motive profoundly influences an individual’s
perception of his or her own culpability. Individuals evaluate the
morality of their own actions differently when those actions derive from
prosocial motives.28 An intent to mislead is an element of fraud in the
common law of crimes and torts, but the motive for intentional
misrepresentations is not an element of fraud. Common law fraud
requires a showing of knowledge of the representation’s falsity or
reckless disregard of its truth and an intent to deceive the victim.29
Intent refers to an actor’s state of mind—whether the act was
performed purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly. Motive, however,
refers to a defendant’s reasons for acting.30 A growing body of research
indicates that motives other than greed—in particular, prosocial
motives such as altruism, equity, collegiality, loyalty, and love—may
have a significant impact on fraudulent behavior.
Examples abound of individuals who commit fraud where the
expected costs exceed any perceived benefits. Auditors assist clients in
misrepresenting their finances; doctors misrepresent patients’ health;
insurance administrators approve uncovered expenses; and employees
lie to protect coworkers.31 The impulse to help is so deeply engrained
that individuals have been willing to lie, cheat, and commit fraud to
increase others’ welfare.32 The desire to help implicates numerous
related prosocial motives—empathy, altruism, fairness, loyalty, sense of
belonging, and love, among others. Each is discussed in turn.

See BLIND SPOTS supra note 16, at 63.
See Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Lying to Level the Playing Field: Why People
May Dishonestly Help or Hurt Others to Create Equity, 95 J. BUS. ETHICS 89, 90 (2010)
[hereinafter Lying to Level].
29 W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 740–41 (5th ed. 1984); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (A.L.I. 1977).
30 Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89,
95 (2006).
31 See Lying to Level, supra note 28, at 89.
32 See generally DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY: HOW WE LIE TO
EVERYONE—ESPECIALLY OURSELVES (2012).
27
28
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1. Empathy and Altruism
Although empathy has often been associated with cooperative and
other prosocial behaviors, it may also drive dishonest behavior.
Empathy may be defined as “a vicarious emotion that one person
experiences when reflecting on the emotion of another,”33 or
understanding and relating to the situation of others.34 It is “a secondorder, affective response to another’s pain”35 or an other-oriented
emotional response to others’ welfare—e.g., feeling sympathetic and
compassionate towards another in need.36 It has thus been used
interchangeably with terms such as sympathy, compassion, and
kindness.37 It is technically not itself an emotion, but a means of
processing and experiencing the emotions of others.38
“[A]ltruism—acting with the goal of benefiting another”39—is
related to empathy in that empathy can produce altruistic motivation.40
When we relate to another’s suffering (empathy), “we hurt in a way that
frequently leads to helping” (altruism).41 Altruism has been defined as
“behavior that benefits another organism, not closely related, while
being apparently detrimental to the organism performing the
behavior”;42 “self-destructive behavior performed for the benefit of
others”;43 or “a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing
another’s welfare.”44 In contrast to benevolence, it generally requires

Jesse Prinz, Against Empathy, 49 S.J. PHIL. 214, 214 (2011).
See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1576
(1987).
35 See Robert B. Cialdini, Altruism or Egoism? That Is (Still) the Question, 2 PSYCH.
INQUIRY 124, 124 (1991).
36 See C. Daniel Batson et al., Immorality from Empathy-Induced Altruism: When
Compassion and Justice Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1042, 1042 (1995).
37 See Norma Deitch Feshbach, Empathy in Children: Some Theoretical and Empirical
Considerations, 5 COUNSELING PSYCH. 25, 25 (1975).
38 See Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging
Field, 30 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 119, 127 (2006).
39 See J.A. Piliavin & H.W. Charng, Altruism: A Review of Recent Theory and Research,
16 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 27, 27 (1990).
40 See C. Daniel Batson, Empathy-Induced Altruistic Motivation, Remarks at the
Inaugural Herzliya Symposium on “Prosocial Motives, Emotions, and Behavior” (Mar.
24–27, 2008), at 11 (draft of lecture on file with author).
41 Cialdini, supra note 35.
42 Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIO. 35, 35
(1971).
43 Edward O. Wilson, The Genetic Evolution of Altruism, in ALTRUISM, SYMPATHY, AND
HELPING: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES 11, 11 (Lauren Wispé ed., 1978).
44 C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 6
(1991).
33
34
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some form of self-sacrifice or other act that is costly for the actor.45 It
has been contrasted with egoism—acting in one’s own self-interest—
i.e., seeking self-benefit and self-gratification.46
Although the literature on altruism and empathy is vast, only
recently have scholars focused on their role in motivating deceitful and
fraudulent behavior. Studies show that people cheat more when there
are beneficiaries in addition to themselves, even if the beneficiaries are
anonymous strangers.47 When individuals’ dishonesty benefits others,
they are more likely to perceive their actions as justified and feel less
guilt.48 By focusing on how their actions are benefiting others,
individuals are able to view their actions in positive terms and avoid
negatively impacting their moral self-image.49 When faced with
competing moral principles—honesty versus benevolence—individuals
prioritizing benevolence over honesty feel they have acted morally.
Indeed, some evidence exists that people view individuals with altruistic
intentions—those who lie to help others—as more moral than those
who choose honesty over benevolence.50
Similarly, considerable research has shown that when individuals
feel empathy for others in need, they act to increase others’ welfare,
even at a cost to themselves.51 When individuals feel empathy for “a
particular individual experiencing a particular need in a particular
situation,” they often seek to benefit that individual to the detriment of
others.52
Experimental subjects induced to feel empathy are
significantly more likely to engage in unethical behavior.53 In lowempathy conditions, individuals tend to act in accordance with
principles of fairness and justice.54 But when they are induced to feel

45 See Emma E. Levine & Maurice E. Schweitzer, Are Liars Ethical? On the Tension
Between Benevolence and Honesty, 53 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 107, 108 (2014).
46 See BATSON, supra note 44, at 5.
47 See Francesca Gino et al., Self-Serving Altruism? The Lure of Unethical Actions that
Benefit Others, 93 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 285, 285 (2013); Scott Wiltermuth, Cheating More
When the Spoils Are Split, 115 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 157, 157 (2011).
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See Levine & Schweitzer, supra note 45, at 109, 115.
51 See C. Daniel Batson & Tecia Moran, Empathy-Induced Altruism in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma, 29 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 909, 911 (1999); Dennis Krebs, Empathy and Altruism, 32
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1134, 1134 (1975).
52 See Batson & Moran, supra note 51, at 921.
53 See Batson et al., supra note 36, at 1042; Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce,
Dishonesty in the Name of Equity, 20 PSYCH. SCI. 1153, 1153–54 (2009).
54 See Batson et al., supra note 36, at 1052.
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empathy for a person in need, they show partiality toward that person,
even when they know the person’s need is not as great as others.55
Examples abound of individuals who act dishonestly or unethically
because of altruism or empathy. Two classic examples include doctors
who approve uncovered expenses and professors who give unearned
grades to low-income students.56 As another example, consider fraud in
the liver transplant market. Data suggests that doctors, motivated by
empathy for their patients, engaged in fraud to game the liver transplant
market.57 Prior to March 2002, doctors began sending relatively healthy
patients to ICUs because ICU patients jumped to the top of priority lists
regardless of sickness level.58 Once this policy changed and liver
allocation was based solely on patients’ sickness levels, the number of
patients in ICUs at the time of their transplants dramatically declined,
while sickness levels of the average patient increased.59 This suggests
that prior to the change, doctors used ICUs more often for patients who
were relatively healthy in order to assure their patients’ access to
livers.60 Similar instances of empathetic fraud are common, including
false reporting of diagnoses on hospital claims61 and auditors’
misrepresentation of client finances.62
2. Equity
Empathy and altruism may also play a role in dishonest helping
behavior motivated by the desire to restore equity.63 Whereas negative
inequity produces feelings of envy, positive inequity induces feelings of
guilt, which motivates individuals to dishonestly help others.64
Particularly where the risks of being caught are low, individuals are
more prone to act on emotions such as envy, guilt, and empathy.65

Id.
See Lying to Level, supra note 28, at 89.
57 Jason Snyder, Gaming the Liver Transplant Market, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 546, 547
(2010).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See id.
61 See Ching-to Albert Ma & Thomas G. McGuire, Optimal Health Insurance and
Provider Payment, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 685, 687 (1997).
62 See Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, 80 HARV. BUS.
REV. 97, 97 (2002).
63 See Lying to Level, supra note 28, at 89.
64 See id. at 91–92.
65 Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Robin Hood Under the Hood: Wealth-Based
Discrimination in Illicit Customer Help, 21 ORG. SCI. 1176, 1177 (2010) [hereinafter Robin
Hood].
55
56
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Moreover, when individuals act dishonestly to restore equity, they
subjectively “discount the immorality of their actions.”66
Take, for instance, fraud in the vehicle emissions testing market.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires states to
implement vehicle emissions programs, but allows states to outsource
some or all testing to privately-owned licensed firms.67 Inspectors have
ample opportunities to cheat, as polluting cars can be certified clean by
making temporary adjustments or by simply substituting other cars
during testing.68 Financial incentives to cheat also exist—customers are
more likely to return to inspection firms that have previously passed
them, and older cars with problems tend to need future mechanical
repairs.69 Financial self-interest, however, does not fully explain
existing data.
In the strictly regulated emissions testing market, inspectors are
prohibited from systematically treating certain types of cars more
leniently than others.70 Yet, a notable number of emissions testers
illegally assist customers driving standard vehicles over those driving
luxury ones. In a series of laboratory studies, Gino and Pierce
manipulated and measured how emotions such as envy and empathy
influenced individuals’ propensity to illegally help their peers.71 They
found that individuals’ likelihood of illicitly assisting others varied
based on the beneficiary’s wealth, with the majority illegally helping
those who exhibited less wealth.72 These results demonstrate that
employees’ emotional reactions to customer wealth can often lead to
discriminatory and fraudulent behavior.
Related research has shown that individuals routinely act against
their own self-interests and are motivated by concerns over fairness,
reciprocity, and equity.73 For instance, researchers in economics have
shown that subjects are willing to change the distribution of outcomes
they perceive as unfair, even at a personal cost.74 They consistently
reward cooperators, punish defectors, and are willing to reject highly
Lying to Level, supra note 28, at 101.
Robin Hood, supra note 65, at 1180.
68 Id.
69 See Thomas N. Hubbard, How Do Consumers Motivate Experts? Reputational
Incentives in an Auto Repair Market, 52 J. L. & ECON. 437, 437 (2002).
70 Robin Hood, supra note 65, at 1181.
71 Id. at 1189.
72 Id.
73 Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity, and
Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF
GIVING, ALTRUISM, AND RECIPROCITY 615, 615 (2006).
74 See Ernst Fehr & S. Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,
14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 159 (2000).
66
67
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uneven proposals.75 Under equity theory, individuals compare the ratio
of their own inputs and outcomes with the ratio of inputs and outcomes
of others. If they perceive inequity in these ratios, they respond by
modifying their inputs or withdrawing.76
Other studies have
demonstrated that inequity generates emotional reactions that result in
dishonest helping or hurting behavior.77 Even more surprisingly,
individuals “judge actions that restore equity as morally appropriate
and ethical even when they involve lying and stealing.”78
3. Loyalty and Sense of Belonging
Individuals may also engage in fraud out of a sense of loyalty to
their organization, friends, families, or other group members.79 Studies
have shown how organizational norms and influences can alter an
individual’s personal ethics.80 Peer pressure can motivate employees to
conform their behavior to those of their peers.81 As individuals move
from one employer to another, their willingness to engage in unethical
behavior appears “to shift with the inclinations of the respective
employer.”82 Moreover, loyalty influences the way people judge their
own behavior—those who are dishonest out of loyalty to their
organization, family, or group feel they acted ethically and morally.83
When evaluating the behavior of others, outsiders view loyalty-driven
deceit as immoral and unethical.84 Moral judgments shift, however,
when the outsiders become insiders. When called on to be loyal to their
group, people are not only more willing to lie, but also to view their lies
as ethical, and more ethical than those who act honestly, but disloyally.85
A competing virtue—loyalty—overcomes honesty, allowing individuals
Id. at 171–172.
See J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267, 284-292 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1965).
77 Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Dishonesty in the Name of Equity, 20 PSYCH. SCI.
1153, 1157 (2009).
78 See Lying to Level, supra note 28, at 92.
79 See V. Anand et al., Business As Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of
Corruption in Organizations, 19 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 9, 13 (2005).
80 See L. Treviño et al., Behavioral Ethics in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. MGMT. 951,
965–968 (2006).
81 See id. at 966; Alexandre Mas & Enrico Moretti, Peers at Work, 99 AM. ECON. REV.
112, 143 (2009).
82 See Lamar Pierce & Jason Snyder, Ethical Spillovers in Firms: Evidence from Vehicle
Emissions Testing, 54 MGMT. SCI. 1891, 1900 (2008).
83 See John A.D. Hildreth & Cameron Anderson, Does Loyalty Trump Honesty? Moral
Judgments of Loyalty-Driven Deceit, 79 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 87, 87 (2018).
84 See id. at 87; see also Uri Gneezy, Deception: The Role of Consequences, 95 AM. ECON.
REV. 384, 390 (2005).
85 See Hildreth & Anderson, supra note 83, at 87.
75
76
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to rationalize their unethical behavior and maintain a positive selfimage.86 Individuals fear the consequences of disloyalty—disgust,
contempt, moral outrage, and social ostracism—and therefore act to
support their group.87
Many examples exist of individuals who commit fraud out of loyalty
to friends, colleagues, or loved ones. Often, white-collar criminals
initiate their schemes by taking advantage of friendships and family
relationships.88 Consider the case of former KPMG partner Scott
London, who was sentenced to fourteen months in prison for providing
confidential, nonpublic information to a friend, Bryan Shaw, in return
for cash, a Rolex watch, jewelry, and Bruce Springsteen tickets.89 The
fascinating aspect of the case was not the brazenness of the illicit
activity—he was photographed accepting bags of cash in a Starbucks
parking lot—but the irrationality of it. Although the payments
established that London had personally profited from the scheme, the
case was unusual in that London appeared to be motivated at least in
part by the desire to help Shaw. The cash and gifts, worth anywhere
from $50,000 to $70,000, were relatively small in comparison to his
estimated $650,000 to $900,000 annual salary.90 London did not need
the cash and did not use the Rolex watch, having always preferred
watches with leather bands.91 In later interviews, London rationalized,
“I was thinking about trying to help out a friend. I thought what we were
doing was small. I only thought of myself and the other individual. I
didn’t ever want anything.”92
Relatedly, the need for a sense of belonging can motivate dishonest,
fraudulent, and illegal behavior. “Belongingness” has been defined as a
“personal involvement (in a social system) to the extent that the person
feels himself to be an indispensable and integral part of the system.”93

86 See TAMAR FRANKEL, THE PONZI SCHEME PUZZLE: A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF CON ARTISTS
AND VICTIMS 16–18 (2012).

See Hildreth & Anderson, supra note 83, at 88.
See Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 573,
585 (1978).
89 See Stuart Pfeifer, Former KPMG Partner Sentenced for Insider Trading, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-kpmg-london-20140425story.html.
90 See id.
91 See Quentin Fottrell, Confessions of Insider Trader Scott London, MARKET WATCH
(June 25, 2014, 12:01 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/confessions-of-aninsider-trader-2014-06-21.
92 Id.
93 Santokh S. Anant, Belongingness and Mental Health: Some Research Findings, 26
ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 391, 391 (1967) (quoting The Need to Belong, 14 CANADA’S MENTAL
HEALTH 22–23 (1966)).
87
88
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The need to belong is “a fundamental human motivation”: “human
beings have a pervasive drive to form and maintain at least a minimum
quantity of lasting, positive, and significant interpersonal
relationships.”94 Indeed, “much of what human beings do is done in the
service of belongingness.”95 Individuals are extremely averse to
breaking social bonds, reacting with distress and resistance to the
ending of relationships, even temporary ones.96 Perhaps one of the most
well-known illustrations of the power of belongingness is gang
membership. Gangs provide a “sense of belonging, self-identity, status,
and emotional support,” and an “opportunity to gain peer respect, group
respect, and a sense of security.”97 Studies have shown that youths “who
do not experience a sense of belongingness to their own families” seek
out gangs for social support and a sense of connection.98 Gangs function,
in effect, as surrogate families.99
This same need for solidarity, belongingness, and group identity
may explain participation and complicity in fraudulent schemes.
Perhaps one of the most disturbing and shocking aspects of massive
organizational fraud is the sheer breadth and extent of the fraud. Rarely
is it ever the case of a few bad apples. Individuals go to extraordinary
lengths to help their colleagues, even when doing so violates moral,
social, and legal proscriptions against lying, cheating, and stealing. Even
those with misgivings go along or turn a blind eye rather than risk
rejection from the group. This behavior has been demonstrated both in
and out of the laboratory setting. For instance, in one group problemsolving experiment, participants who learned that there would be other
beneficiaries inflated their scores even more than when their cheating
benefited only themselves.100 In another experiment, college students
acquiesced to an assigned group partner’s cheating, and then actively
lied to conceal the cheating.101 In another, lying was more pronounced
94 Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal
Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCH. BULL. 497, 497 (1995).
95 Id. at 498.
96 See id. at 502; see also Cindy Hazan & Phillip R. Shaver, Attachment as an
Organizational Framework for Research on Close Relationships, 5 PSYCH. INQUIRY 1, 14
(1994).
97 Michael M. Omizo et al., A Phenomenological Study with Youth Gang Members:
Results and Implications for School Counselors, 1 PROF. SCH. COUNSELING 39, 39 (1997).
98 See Thomas W. Baskin et al., Family Belongingness, Gang Friendships, and
Psychological Distress in Adolescent Achievement, 92 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 398, 399 (2014).
99 See Danny Malec, Transforming Latino Gang Violence in the United States, 18 PEACE
REV.: J. SOC. JUST. 81, 85 (2006).
100 See ARIELY, supra note 32, at 226.
101 See F.L. Geis & T.H. Moon, Machiavellianism and Deception, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 766, 766 (1981).
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under team incentives, presumably because individuals can diffuse their
responsibility.102
These results have borne out in practice. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco,
Bernie Madoff, and other major fraud scandals could not have been
effectuated without the cooperation of numerous employees over an
extended period. In Madoff’s case, members of his inner circle—
including his secretary, back-office workers, computer programmers,
and other employees—willfully lied, falsified documents, hid evidence,
and back-dated transactions.103 More recently, in June 2019, the SEC
charged KPMG LLP with altering past audit work after KPMG obtained
confidential Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) lists
of inspection targets.104 In an elaborate scheme, KPMG auditors who
passed training exams sent their answers to colleagues to help them
obtain passing scores and manipulated an internal server to lower the
score required for passing.105 Perversely, the affective ties that bound
these workers played a vital role in the propagation of the fraud.
4. Love
Finally, the impulse to help those we love can be a powerful
motivator. Fraud motivated by love is particularly insidious because the
emotional and social bonds that initially induce the fraud also make
deterrence more elusive. The 2019 college admissions scandal, in which
dozens of parents conspired to fraudulently have their children
admitted to top colleges and universities, has been reviled as brazen
illustrations of dishonesty, corruption, privilege, and entitlement.106 For
the ultra-rich, getting into an elite college conferred social standing,
status, privilege, and bragging rights.107 But what else could have
motivated these otherwise law-abiding, prominent, and wealthy
parents to risk everything to get their children into the school of their
choice? Interviews with parents implicated in the scandal revealed
stories of parents desperate to go to extraordinary lengths to help their
See Julian Conrads et al., Lying and Team Incentives, 34 J. ECON. PSYCH. 1, 1–2 (2013).
See Rodger Adair, Bernie Madoff’s Inner Circle: Cases and Commentaries, in
FOLLOWERSHIP IN ACTION 215, 215–223 (2016).
104 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,, KPMG Paying $50 Million Penalty for
Illicit Use of PCAOB Data and Cheating on Training Exams (June 17, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-95.
105 Id.
106 See Graham Kates, Lori Loughlin and Felicity Huffman Among Dozens Charged in
College Bribery Scheme, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2019, 8:35 PM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/college-admissions-scandal-bribery-cheating-today-felicityhuffman-arrested-fbi-2019-03-12/.
107 See MELISSA KORN & JENNIFER LEVITZ, UNACCEPTABLE: PRIVILEGE, DECEIT & THE MAKING OF
THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS SCANDAL 29–30 (2020).
102
103
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loved ones succeed.108 They were invested in every aspect of their
children’s lives, proactively intervening and implementing fixes
whenever challenges presented themselves. Having done everything
for their children their entire lives, the parents seemingly lost trust and
faith in their children’s ability to do things on their own.109
Social comparisons and competitive fears also played pivotal roles.
Acceptance rates at highly selective colleges plummeted, making the
“college admissions mania” a crisis for the roughly 3 percent of students
aspiring to schools admitting fewer than half their applicants.110
Parents were led “to believe that the elite colleges are the only choices
for their student to have the best education and to ‘make it’ in life and in
their chosen career path.”111
Watching other parents go to
extraordinary lengths to help their children get ahead created a sense of
urgency that their own children would be left behind. Even those
disinclined to cheat felt compelled to cheat to compete with those who
did.112 The presence of a beneficiary—their loved ones—allowed the
parents to rationalize their dishonesty in a way that preserved their selfimage.
C. Moral Ambiguity
Hence, prosocial fraud presents an inherent moral dilemma. Lying,
deception, and fraud are universally seen as immoral acts, and honesty
is extolled as an important component of moral character.113 But in the
context of prosocial fraud, an alternate source of intrinsic motivation—
benevolence and care—can eclipse legal strictures.
In moral
psychology, justice and care have formed two central pillars of moral
exemplarity.114 Justice prioritizes fairness, honesty, and adherence to
overarching moral principles and rules, such as in the maxim “do not

Id.
Id. at 30.
110 Alia Wong, The Absurdity of College Admissions: How Did Getting Into an Elite
School Become a Frenzied, Soul-Deadening Process?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/03/where-admissions-wentwrong/475575/ (quoting Derek Thompson, ‘It Doesn’t Matter Where You Go to College’:
Inspirational, but Wrong, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/the-3-percent-crisis/389396/.).
111 Brennan Barnard, The College Admission Scandal: Voices of Reason Part One,
FORBES (Mar. 30, 2019, 7:17 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brennanbarnard/2019/03/30/the-college-admission-scandal-voices-of-reason-part-one/.
112 KORN & LEVITZ, supra note 107, at 77.
113 See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATION OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (L.W. Beck transl.,
1959) (1785).
114 See Jonathan Haidt & Jesse Graham, When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives
Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals May Not Recognize, 20 SOC. JUST. RSCH. 98, 100 (2007).
108
109
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lie.”115 Care, on the other hand, prioritizes the duty to help and protect
others.116 Although both are united in the view that morality centers on
protecting individuals, they vary in the primacy accorded to each
attribute.117 The justice imperative correlates closely with the
deontological view that lying is immoral because it violates the right to
the truth and respect for individual autonomy.118 Deontologists believe
the goodness of a result does not determine the morality of an act; other
factors may also be relevant.119 Consequentialists, on the other hand,
believe that morality requires performing the act with the best
consequences.120 Utilitarianism, the most famous consequentialist
theory, holds that an act is right if and only if it results in the greatest
total amount of well-being.121 Under this view, the ethicality of lying
ultimately depends on its consequences. Lies that help others may
therefore be justified.122
In situations where justice/honesty and care/benevolence conflict,
some individuals instinctively privilege benevolence over honesty.123
Emerging research indicates that individuals judge deception motivated
by benevolence differently from purely self-interested deception. In
fact, it may be that those who lie to help others are perceived to be more
moral and trustworthy than those who privilege honesty.124 Individuals
discount the wrongness of dishonest behavior when their actions can be
described as helping others. While they may theoretically espouse the
deontological view that lying is immoral, they easily shift to a utilitarian
focus on consequences to justify their helping, but dishonest, behavior.
III. STRUCTURAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS
This self-deceptive rationalization process is further facilitated by
structural, social, and situational forces that can undermine the impact
of legal sanctions. This Part identifies three factors that increase the
pervasiveness of prosocial fraud: (a) definitional ambiguity; (b)

See Levine & Schweitzer, supra note 45, at 108.
Id.
117 See Haidt & Graham, supra note 114, at 100.
118 IMMANUEL KANT, Of Ethical Duties Towards Others, and Especially Truthfulness, in
LECTURES ON ETHICS 200, 200–01 (Peter Heath & J.B. Schneewind eds., Peter Heath trans.,
1997).
119 See SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 74 (1997).
120 Id. at 61.
121 Id.; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION, 6–7 (1843).
122 See Levine & Schweitzer, supra note 45, at 115.
123 See id.
124 Id.
115
116
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incrementalism; and (c) third-party complicity. Each is discussed in
turn.
A. Definitional Ambiguity
For a concept as ubiquitous as fraud, the law surprisingly provides
no definition. The lacuna is purposeful; its aim is to cover a broad swath
of novel and constantly evolving forms of wrongdoing. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines it as “[a] knowing misrepresentation or knowing
concealment of a material fact made to induce another to act to his or
her detriment.”125
Some courts have defined it as:
Any artifice whereby he who practises it gains, or attempts to
gain, some undue advantage to himself, or to work some
wrong or do some injury to another, by means of a
representation which he knows to be false, or of an act which
he knows to be against right or in violation of some positive
duty.126
Others have defined fraud as any attempt to “gain an advantage over
another by false suggestions or by the suppression of truth.”127 Still
others have defined it even more broadly to include any conduct that
strays from “moral uprightness, . . . fundamental honesty, fair play and
right dealing in the general and business life of members of society.”128
With such a broad standard, however, it is unclear what the
distinction is between lying and deceit.129 Lying can be viewed as a
subset of deception, but deception does not necessarily involve lying.
“Lying” has been defined as “a statement made by one who does not
believe it with the intention that someone else shall be led to believe

Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, 76 Mass. 173, 203 (1857).
127 McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Stapleton v. Holt,
207 Okla. 443, 445 (1952)).
128 Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1958); see also United States
v. Bishop, 825 F.2d 1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. States, 488 F.2d
761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973)); United States v. Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902, 908 (6th Cir. 1986)
(quoting United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1979)).
129 Fraud has often been used synonymously with the term deceit. See Ellen S.
Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 737 n.57 (1999) (quoting 1 EDWARD J.
DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 16.08 (4th ed. 1992)).
125
126
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it”130 or simply making “an untrue statement with intent to deceive.”131
The basic elements are a false statement and an intent to mislead.
Although lying is viewed as wrongful conduct, the law does not
proscribe it except in certain contexts, such as perjury or defamation.
Deception, on the other hand, can involve not only affirmative
misrepresentations, but also omissions and non-verbal behavior.132
Fraud is legally actionable deception—intentional deception where
there is damage to the party deceived.133 Fraud can be brought as a civil
action, criminal action, or both. As a civil wrong, it can be brought as a
private action in tort or contract, with the injured party bringing suit for
damages.134 Although requirements vary by jurisdiction, generally the
requisite elements of common law civil fraud include an affirmative
misrepresentation or omission of material fact, an intent to deceive,
reliance on the misrepresentation, and loss proximately caused by the
misrepresentation.135 Some jurisdictions require parties to prove each
element by clear and convincing evidence, making it difficult to bring
successful fraud claims.136
The current structural framework consists of subject-specific
definitions superimposed on catch-all generic definitions, such as mail
fraud,137 wire fraud,138 and conspiracy to defraud.139 The statutes are
staggering in breadth, providing little guidance on what conduct is
proscribed. For instance, the mail fraud statute prohibits the use of the
post office or interstate carrier for the execution of a scheme or artifice
to defraud, but does not provide a definition of the term “defraud.”140
Although the statute was originally intended “to criminalize counterfeit

130 Arnold Isenberg, Deontology and the Ethics of Lying, 24 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RSCH. 463, 466 (1964); see also Bryon H. Druzin & Jessica Li, The Criminalization of Lying:
Under What Circumstances, If Any, Should Lies Be Made Criminal, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 529, 533 (2011).
131 Lie, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2021), https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/lie (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
132 See Druzin & Li, supra note 130, at 565.
133 See Milton D. Green, Fraud, Undue Influence and Mental Incompetency, 43 COLUM.
L. REV. 176, 179 (1943).
134 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1976) (defining elements of liability for
fraudulent misrepresentation); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1981)
(defining when a misrepresentation is fraudulent or material).
135 See Scaife Co. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 285 A.2d 451, 454 (Pa. 1971), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 920 (1972); Sevin v. Kelshaw, 611 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
136 See Pittsburgh Live, Inc. v. Servov, 615 A.2d 438, 441 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
137 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
138 See 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
139 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
140 See id.
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schemes that were using the postal system,”141 it has since been
expanded to encompass any fraudulent schemes utilizing an interstate
carrier.142 The government need only show (1) a scheme to defraud, (2)
intent to defraud, and (3) use of the mails to further the fraudulent
scheme.143 The wire fraud statute is similarly broad in scope,
prohibiting “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or [to obtain] money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses . . . by means of wire,
radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce.”144 In contrast to common law civil fraud, federal criminal
fraud does not require a showing of reliance or detriment.145
Other fraud statutes, such as computer fraud,146 health care
fraud,147 bank fraud,148 and securities fraud,149 focus on specific types of
fraud. For instance, the bank fraud statute prohibits schemes to
“defraud a financial institution” and schemes to obtain money or
property “owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial
institution.”150 Similarly, the securities fraud statute prohibits the use
of “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in connection
with the “purchase or sale of any security.”151 Like the mail and wire
fraud statutes, however, they define fraud by reference to the term
“defraud” or a “scheme or artifice to defraud” without providing further
guidance on the meaning of that term.152
The lack of a definition has resulted in an intricate, conflicting, and
inconsistent body of common law characterized by a progressive
blurring of the civil-criminal divide.153 The job of policing this divide has
fallen on prosecutors, who individually make subjective determinations
of moral culpability and societal harm. But prosecutors often have

141 Ellen S. Podgor, Tax Fraud—Mail Fraud: Synonymous, Cumulative or Diverse?, 57
U. CIN. L. REV. 903, 906 (1989).
142 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341; see also Podgor, supra note 129, at 753.
143 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341; see also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954).
144 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
145 See Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV.
1295, 1323 (2008).
146 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
147 See 18 U.S.C. § 1347.
148 See 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
149 See 18 U.S.C. § 1348; see also Podgor, supra note 129, at 756.
150 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
151 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).
152 See 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
153 See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV.
469, 476 (1996).
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bureaucratic or personal incentives to selectively prosecute higher
profile defendants, resulting in sporadic and uneven enforcement.154
In addition, a lack of statutory gradation facilitates the motivational
biases discussed above.155 The current statutory scheme fails to
distinguish low-level fraud from massive, organizational fraud, other
than at the sentencing stage. As Miriam Baer has noted, “There is no
such thing as first- or second-degree mail or wire fraud. Rather, all of
the major fraud offenses, whether they threaten the evisceration of an
entire industry or defraud an unfortunate few, fit under the same
statutory umbrella.”156 When all the variegated forms of fraud are
subsumed under one category—the “scheme or artifice to defraud”—it
creates problems of identification, monitoring, and deterrence.
Consider gradations of intent. Federal fraud law criminalizes
“willful [and] specific intent to defraud.”157 But courts interpreted this
language very broadly to include not only purposeful frauds, but also
impulsive and reckless ones. For instance, statements made in reckless
disregard of their truth satisfy the requirement of purposefully
deceptive conduct.158 Similarly, conspiracy and accomplice liability
statutes do not distinguish states of mind and “treat accomplices and
principals identically.”159 But studies have shown that many ordinary
people engage in fraud non-deliberatively, and sometimes
subconsciously.160 When the law conflates the reluctant, noncalculative fraudster with the calculative one, individuals are more
likely to engage in motivated reasoning and euphemistic
categorizations.
Rather than deterring individuals from acting opportunistically,
this ambiguity in the substance, structure, and contours of fraud can
have the opposite effect: it can encourage individuals to choose
interpretations that advance their self-interests.161 In addition to
increasing the likelihood of selfish behavior, ambiguity encourages

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models—and What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1888 (1992).
155 See Miriam H. Baer, Sorting Out White-Collar Crime, 97 TEX. L. REV. 225, 227
(2018).
156 Id. at 228.
157 Id. at 248 (quoting United States v. Dearing, 504 F.3d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 2007)).
158 See Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 556–59 (2011).
159 See Baer, supra note 155, at 252 (citing Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240,
1245 (2014)).
160 See FELDMAN, supra note 6, at 129.
161 See Maurice E. Schweitzer & Christopher K. Hsee, Stretching the Truth: Elastic
Justification and Motivated Communication of Uncertain Information, 25 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 185, 185 (2002); see also FELDMAN, supra note 6, at 195.
154
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people to feel more confident in their own ethicality.162 Definitional
ambiguity allows individuals to engage in “euphemistic labeling” and
mental categorizing to “justify their opportunistic behaviors,” both to
themselves and to others.163 For instance, when stealing is reclassified
as “shifting resources” or “creative accounting,” individuals are able to
reap the benefits of stealing while maintaining their self-identity as
moral, ethical, law-abiding citizens.
B. Incrementalism
In addition to the above structural factors, tolerance of incremental
dishonesty works in conjunction with prosocial motivation to produce
perverse results. Incrementalism refers to the process of modifying the
status quo through minor changes.164 Research demonstrates that
“getting people to perform a small, seemingly inconsequential task can
be an effective strategy for changing subsequent attitudes and
behaviors.”165 Often, massive organizational fraud begins with a
seemingly harmless and minor modification—an added zero here, a
fudged date there. The more minor the initial modification, the easier it
is to justify and ignore. The justifications, though at times self-serving,
also tend to be prosocial in nature—helping a coworker; saving a job;
being a team player. Max Bazerman and Ann Tenbrunsel found that
individuals are more likely to accept unethical behavior by others “as
long as each violation is only incrementally more serious than the
preceding one.”166 In their experiment, participants acting as “auditors”
were twice as likely to approve guesses if the “estimators” arrived at the
guesses through incremental increases rather than abrupt ones.167
Take the case of Toby Groves, the one-time owner of a mortgage
brokerage business, Groves Funding Corp., who was sentenced in
November 2008 for defrauding several financial institutions and
falsifying income tax filings.168 The fraud started small. When his
See FELDMAN, supra note 6, at 195.
See Yuval Feldman & Henry E. Smith, Behavioral Equity, 170 J. INST. & THEORETICAL
ECON. 137, 146 (2014).
164 Incrementalism, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY (2021), https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/
incrementalism (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
165 Jerry M. Burger, Situational Features in Milgram’s Experiment That Kept His
Participants Shocking, J. SOC. ISSUES 489, 491 (2014).
166 Max H. Bazerman & Ann E. Tenbrunsel, Ethical Breakdowns, 89 HARV. BUS. REV. 58,
63 (2011).
167 See id. at 64.
168 See Laura Baverman, Former Mortgage Broker Groves to Be Sentenced for Fraud,
CIN, BUS. COURIER (Aug. 7, 2008, 2:11 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/stories/2008/08/04/daily48.html.
162
163
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business began experiencing financial difficulties in 2003, Groves took
out a home equity loan.169 Realizing that he would not be approved for
the loan if he truthfully reported his income, Groves rationalized: “If I
just fudge the number a little, I’ll fix this big problem. I’ll save the
company, save jobs.”170 However, the fraud did not end there. To pay
off the first loan, he documented a loan for a fictitious home with the
willing help of his employees and other companies.171 Not a single
person whom he approached expressed any reservations: “They didn’t
see it as a crime, but rather as helping a friend out of a tight spot.”172
The power of incrementalism is perhaps most strikingly
demonstrated by Stanley Milgram’s famous experiment on obedience to
authority. Participants playing the role of “teacher” were told to
administer electric shocks of increasing magnitude whenever actors
playing the role of “learner” answered questions incorrectly.173 While
the experiment is famous for its demonstration of the extraordinary
lengths that individuals will go to obey authority, it is also a powerful
demonstration of the power of incrementalism.174 Although more than
half of the teachers eventually administered shocks of over 300 volts,
after which point the learner went silent and presumably lost
consciousness, each of the teachers began by giving only a mild shock of
fifteen volts. Teachers received instructions to punish subsequent
wrong answers with slightly stronger shocks in fifteen-volt increments
up to 450 volts.175 Each gradual increase changed the baseline,
becoming “the new normal” and making it easier to justify the next
fifteen-volt increase.176
Incrementalism addresses the human need to be considered—and
to see oneself—as honest and ethical, while at the same time serving
one’s self-interests. It is easier to fool oneself when the cheating is small
and incremental. When fraud operates incrementally, it is even more
difficult to detect. Low-level cheating is notoriously difficult to monitor.
Indeed, “[u]ncovering evidence of ethically dubious strategies is quite
difficult because these practices are usually hidden under a veil of
169 Devon M. Zuegel, Empathy for the Devil, MEDIUM (Oct. 8, 2017), https://medium.com/by-the-bay/empathy-for-the-devil-5b7cc3c1613a.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH.
371, 371–72 (1963).
174 See Steven J. Gilbert, Another Look at the Milgram Obedience Studies: The Role of
the Gradated Series of Shocks, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 690, 690–91 (1981).
175 See id.; see also Burger, supra note 165, at 492.
176 See Jennifer Crocker, The Road to Fraud Starts with a Single Step, 479 NATURE 151,
151 (2011).

LEE (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

11/8/21 4:15 PM

PROSOCIAL FRAUD

223

secrecy.”177 Many of the largest fraud scandals began with small scale
manipulations that eventually took on a life of their own. Enron began
exaggerating earnings and hiding losses by recognizing gains on sales of
assets to special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) before realizing profits and
by moving portions of its debt onto the SPVs’ balance sheets.178 For
instance, in a partnership with Blockbuster to provide movies directly
through telephone lines, dubbed Project Braveheart, Enron recorded
$110.9 million in profits before profits were ever realized.179 These
instances of creative accounting were viewed as timing issues, not
ethical ones.180 To ensure that these SPVs would not be considered
subsidiaries, Enron exploited a Financial Accounting Standards Board
(“FASB”) rule that independently managed partnerships would not be
considered subsidiaries if 3 percent of their equity came from outside
investors.181
Small infractions allow fraudsters to operate under the radar and
test the waters. If the infraction goes unnoticed, this opens the door to
incrementally larger instances of fraud. If the infraction is caught, the
fraudster can simply claim ignorance or mistake. But all too often,
victims of small cheats never detect the cheating. As Emily Kadens
noted, “[I]f victims discover the breach, the cheat may be minor enough
that they may not be sure whether a trading partner had merely made a
mistake she will happily correct, committed an inadvertent breach that
will never happen again, or deliberately wronged them.”182
Moreover, when fraud operates incrementally, it is much less likely
to be punished, both formally through legal sanctions and informally
through social sanctions. The legal system is constrained by finite
resources, and as a result, enforcement tends to be selective and
sporadic, with tremendous discretion accorded to prosecutors. The
common law principle of de minimis non curat lex (“the law does not
concern itself with trifles”) in effect allows much low-level fraud to go
unpunished. In securities law, the concept of materiality operates as a
broad threshold requirement for both the disclosure requirements and
antifraud provisions of the securities laws.183 If a misstatement or
omission is not material—i.e., significant to the reasonable investor
Snyder, supra note 57, at 547.
See Ronald R. Sims & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron Ethics (Or: Culture Matters More
than Codes), 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 243, 245 (2003).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 See id.
182 Emily Kadens, Cheating Pays, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 530 (2019).
183 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 62 (2003).
177
178
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given the total mix of information—it is not legally actionable.184 In
other words, if a false statement or omission is relatively minor, it will
likely go unpunished. Where, as in the case of prosocial fraud, the
wrongdoing is morally ambiguous, the likelihood of prosecution and
punishment is greatly reduced.
C. Third-Party Complicity
While formal sanctions are constrained by resource limitations,
informal sanctions tend to be uneven and unreliable. Why do third
parties so often fail to sanction dishonest and fraudulent behavior? In
the case of low-level fraud, third parties who hear negative gossip “may
not be confident whether the cheater actually cheated or the alleged
victim was complaining unjustifiably about imperfect performance
caused by a mistake or some inadvertent or unavoidable situation.”185
Concern for reputation does not effectively deter opportunistic
behavior because the end result is often competing reputations, not
ostracism.186 Further, in many situations, wrongdoing occurs in the
context of complex organizations, where many different stakeholders,
including board of directors, managers, and employees, share decisionmaking and responsibility.187 Diffusion of responsibility, in which
individuals feel less compelled to act in the presence of others,
contributes to their ability to morally disengage, particularly in
ambiguous contexts.188 Studies show the presence of others makes
individuals feel less responsible for their actions, particularly the
negative consequences of group decisions.189
In addition, when offenses involve harms and victims that are
difficult to identify or quantify—e.g., loss of investor confidence—it is
easier to morally disengage from them. Particularly where there are
“small harms” to “large number[s] of victims” that “are significant only
in the aggregate,” individuals can convince themselves that such
184 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2021) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly
or indirectly . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not misleading.”).
185 Kadens, supra note 182, at 538.
186 See id.
187 See Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 16 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 510 (2004).
188 See Frederike Beyer et al., Beyond Self-Serving Bias: Diffusion of Responsibility
Reduces Sense of Agency and Outcome Monitoring, 12 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 138, 144 (2017).
189 See id. at 138; see also Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory of Self-Regulation,
50 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 248, 281 (1991); D.R. Forsyth et al.,
Responsibility Diffusion in Cooperative Collectives, 28 PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 54, 54
(2002).
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conduct is not morally wrong.190 Studies have shown that individuals
are more willing to hurt people who are “unknown and probabilistic,”
than people who they know.191 Individuals are better able to mentally
and emotionally disengage from general, as opposed to specific
targets.192 Indeed, in what has become known as the “identifiable victim
effect,” Thomas Schelling observed that the death of a particular person
invokes “anxiety and sentiment, guilt and awe, responsibility and
religion, [but] . . . most of this awesomeness disappears when we deal
with statistical death.”193
Studies have demonstrated how easily and readily third parties can
turn a blind eye. Motivated blindness refers to the tendency to fail to
notice unethical behavior in others when it is not in our interest to do
so.194
Individuals have well-documented cognitive biases that
predispose them to “see what they want to see” and “miss contradictory
information when it’s in their interest to remain ignorant . . . .”195
Indeed, “people who have a vested self-interest in a situation have
difficulty approaching the situation without bias, even when they view
themselves as honest.”196 Significant numbers of people routinely
observe, but disregard—whether consciously or unconsciously—
unethical behavior.197 Motivated blindness can thus contribute to the
propagation of prosocial fraud by undermining the effectiveness of
social sanctions.
Third-party complicity is motivated by self-interest, fear, or
laziness, and it can take a number of different forms—the calculating
opportunist (“Type A”), the slavish sycophant (“Type B”), the team
player (“Type C”), and the lazy, distracted, or selfish pacifist (“Type D”).
I examine each in turn.
1. Type A: The Calculating Opportunist
The calculating opportunist observes dishonest or fraudulent
behavior and weighs the costs and benefits of sanctioning the fraudster.

See Green, supra note 187, at 509–10.
See Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 7, at 197; see also Deborah A. Small & George
Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J.
RISK UNCERTAINTY 5, 5 (2003).
192 See Small & Loewenstein, supra note 191, at 6.
193 Small & Loewenstein, supra note 191, at 5 (quoting Thomas C. Schelling, The Life
You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 142 (Samuel B.
Chase ed., 1968)).
194 Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, Ethical Breakdowns, supra note 166, at 5
195 Id.
196 BLIND SPOTS, supra note 16, at 64.
197 See id. at 63.
190
191
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Fully knowledgeable about the fraudster’s dishonesty, he turns a blind
eye because doing so will serve his self-interests. As a general matter,
he seeks to be on good terms with those in positions of authority and to
avoid conflict with others in case they may be useful to him in the
future.198 Perhaps he believes that demonstrating his loyalty will
advance his career interests and prospects for advancement. Perhaps
he is lured by the prospect of financial enrichment or fears that
confronting the fraud will be more costly to him than ignoring it. His
thought process is coldly rational and distinctly Machiavellian.
The Machiavellian pursuit of self-interest has become “uniquely
synonymous with amoral action, sharp dealing, hidden agendas, and
unethical excess.”199 In 1970, Richard Christie and Florence Geis
constructed a theory of Machiavellianism that distinguished between
“High Machs” and “Low Machs”: “High Machs manipulate more, win
more, [and] are persuaded less” and believe that people are fair game
for any means of exploitation.200 They “take a calculated [and] analytical
view of situations” and individuals, prepared to do whatever it takes to
advance their own objectives.201 Their strategic bent also translates into
skill at concealing their true personal convictions.202 They fail to
sanction the fraudster because of situational opportunism, further
contributing to the propagation of the fraud.
2. Type B: The Slavish Sycophant
Relatedly, the slavish sycophant (“Type B”) actively seeks out those
in positions of authority. Anxious to demonstrate his loyalty, he
showers his subject with praise and hangs on his every word. Both
calculating opportunists and slavish sycophants are motivated by selfinterest. But while the calculating opportunist makes a conscious and
deliberate decision to turn a blind eye, the slavish sycophant appears
incapable of acknowledging inconvenient information. In his classic
study of sycophancy, Edward E. Jones identified three types of
ingratiation: other-enhancement, opinion conformity, and selfpresentation.203 Other-enhancement involves flattery and other efforts
See Mark Travers, Crucial Red Flags of Dark Triad Traits, PSYCH. TODAY (Aug. 9,
2020),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/social-instincts/202008/howspot-dark-personality.
199 See George Nelson & Diana Gilbertson, Machiavellianism Revisited, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS
633, 633 (1991) (citing P. RALPH, THE RENAISSANCE IN PERSPECTIVE 23–24 (1973)).
200 See id. at 633–34 (quoting RICHARD CHRISTIE & FLORENCE GEIS, STUDIES IN
MACHIAVELLIANISM 312 (1970)).
201 See id. at 635.
202 See id. at 636.
203 See EDWARD E. JONES, INGRATIATION: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 24 (1964).
198
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to convey admiration of the target. Opinion conformity involves
agreeing “with the target’s attitudes, norms, and beliefs.”204 And selfpresentation refers to the sycophant’s efforts to present himself in a
positive manner. Jones surmised that ingratiators disguise their true
attitudes and beliefs, employing various strategic tactics to manipulate
others to view them favorably.205
Research has shown not only that individuals are highly
susceptible to flattery, but also that sycophancy can be effective.206
Indeed, both laboratory and field studies indicate that “supervisorfocused impression-management tactics” enhanced supervisor liking
for the subordinate.207 Liking, in turn, often translates into positive
performance ratings.208 Perhaps for this reason, sycophants in some
form persist in every organization. Their presence undermines the
ability of social sanctions to reliably gain a foothold to deter and punish
fraudulent behavior.
3. Type C: The Team Player
The team player (“Type C”) fears accountability and values
conformity, particularly in situations where he is unsure of what to do.
“Conformity refers to the act of changing one’s behavior to match the
responses of others.”209 Social psychologists have identified two types
of conformity—informational conformity and normative conformity.
Informational conformity refers to relying on others for information and
guidance.210 Normative conformity refers to conforming in order to be
liked or accepted by the group.211 When faced with ambiguity, Type C
individuals observe others’ actions as a guide to how they should
behave, imitating those who they believe are better informed. They
disregard readily available facts and data to do what others are doing,
fearing that even small deviations from the norm will impair their ability
204 See Kayyum A. Bohra & Janak Pandey, Ingratiation Toward Strangers, Friends, and
Bosses, 122 J. SOC. PSYCH. 217, 218 (1984).
205 See id. at 45; see also Bohra & Pandey, supra note 204, at 218.
206 See Sandy J. Wayne & Gerald R. Ferris, Influence Tactics, Affect, and Exchange
Quality in Supervisor-Subordinate Interactions: A Laboratory Experiment and Field Study,
75 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 487, 495 (1990).
207 See id.
208 See id.; see also Robert L. Cardy & Gregory H. Dobbins, Affect and Appraisal
Accuracy: Liking as an Integral Dimension in Evaluating Performance, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCH.
672, 676 (1986) (indicating that affective reactions influence the performance-appraisal
process).
209 See Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence: Compliance and
Conformity, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 591, 606 (2004).
210 Id.
211 Id.
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to be liked and accepted.212 Solomon Asch’s classic experiment on
conformity encapsulates this mindset. For as simple of a task as
comparing the length of different lines, approximately one-third of
participants conformed to a clearly incorrect majority consensus.213
Later interviews affirmed that the subjects conformed because (i) they
wanted to fit in with the majority; or (ii) they believed the majority had
better information.214 Conforming subjects reported fearing that the
majority would think they were “queer”; others simply wanted to avoid
being the center of attention or being disapproved of by others.215
4. Type D: The Distracted Pacifist
The distracted pacifist (“Type D”) is a catchall category that
encompasses third parties who fail to sanction the fraudster because of
laziness, selfishness, exhaustion, or simple distraction. The distracted
pacifist refuses to impose sanctions because accountability is costly—in
both time and effort. He prefers to take the path of least resistance,
leaving it up to others to impose sanctions. He fails to sanction the
fraudster not because of the prospect of personal gain, but because of
perceived time constraints or fear of others’ disapproval. Indeed,
studies have shown that many individuals feel compelled to remain
silent when faced with concerns or problems.216 They fear being labeled
as a “troublemaker” or “tattletale”; many fear no longer being liked by
their colleagues or no longer being seen as credible.217
In addition, individuals are more likely to cheat when “resources
for self-control have been depleted by prior exertion.”218 For third
parties, the natural inclination to do nothing is a powerful one—one that
is supported by structural and environmental conditions. Type D
pacifists contribute to the perpetuation of misconduct simply through
inaction.

See B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J. POL. ECON. 841, 864 (1994).
See Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One
Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCH. MONOGRAPHS 1, 69–70 (1956).
214 Id.
215 See id. at 31.
216 See Elizabeth W. Morrison & Frances J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A Barrier
to Change and Development in a Pluralistic World, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 706, 706 (2000).
217 See Frances J. Milliken et al., An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that
Employees Don’t Communicate Upward and Why, 40 J. MGMT. STUD. 1453, 1463 (2003).
218 See Nicole L. Mead et al., Too Tired to Tell the Truth: Self-Control Resource Depletion
and Dishonesty, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 594, 594, 596 (2009).
212
213
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IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
If, as the emerging research suggests, the impulse to help others
often overrides the impulse to be honest, how should the law respond?
The law impacts behavior directly through sanctions, and indirectly
through social norms and intrinsic motivation. Prosocial fraud presents
unique challenges because its defining characteristics—prosocial
motivation and moral ambiguity—render it less responsive to
traditional legal and social sanctions. If prosocial motives predispose us
to act against our rational self-interest, it suggests that the current
incentive-based legal framework does not accurately or adequately
capture human behavior. The law adopts an atomized, individualistic
conception of fraudulent behavior: autonomous, rational actors who
must be constrained by legal strictures to curb their instinctive pursuit
of self-interest. Liability rests on proof of prescribed and immutable
formulae centered on the actor’s intent, reliance, and loss. Outside of
the sentencing stage, the law pays little attention to motive and
situational context.
In part, this formulistic approach is a product of necessity. If every
fraud prosecution were saddled with fact-based determinations of
motive and culpability, the result could be paralyzing. Evidence of a
person’s motives would be difficult to establish, and every selfinterested defendant could claim prosocial motives post hoc. But the
current approach is at odds with evidence of how individuals actually
behave. Where individual morality diverges from legal strictures and
pronouncements, the law can lose some of its moral and practical force.
The resulting arbitrariness can undermine trust and impair deterrence.
This Part argues that the solution is not to supplant the existing
framework, but to supplement it. The first step is to recognize and
understand the problem of prosocial fraud. Not all fraud is motivated
by financial self-interest. Prosocially motivated fraud is particularly
insidious because it leverages our emotional need to help others with a
psychological tendency to manipulate information and memories in
self-serving ways. Some solutions to counteract these tendencies
include making ethics salient before actors engage in decision-making
processes, such as requiring signatures at the beginning rather than end
of a self-report.219 Simple triggers, such as reading the Ten
Commandments, have proven effective, presumably because they place

219 Lisa L. Shu et al., Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases
Dishonest Self-Reports in Comparison to Signing at the End, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S.
15,197, 15,197 (2012).
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individuals in an ethical frame.220 But in the context of prosocial fraud,
greater education and awareness remain limited by the same biases and
constraints that have rendered it such an elusive enforcement target.
Ultimately, lasting and effective change would require a systematic
shift in the values and preferences that give rise to prosocial fraud.
Prosocial fraud presents unique challenges because of a fundamental
disconnect between the legal system’s judgment of culpability and the
perpetrator’s perception of his or her culpability. In this situation, the
law imposes liability not for failure to behave prosocially, but because
of it. How can the legal system change the social meaning of
benevolence-based fraud and influence individuals’ beliefs about its
inherent morality? Below, I analyze two classic levers developed by
Gary Becker—adjusting the severity of punishment versus increasing
the likelihood of enforcement. After arguing against the effectiveness of
increased sanctions, this Article explores the relative merits of different
enforcement tools—private causes of action, whistleblowers, and
gatekeepers.
A. Adjusting Sanctions
One approach to curbing prosocially motivated fraud is to target
sanctions. Many scholars have argued for the deterrent, retributive, and
expressive value of harsh punishments, while others have cautioned
against the perils of over-criminalizing non-willful, morally ambiguous
conduct.221 Proposed reforms include systematic accounting of motive
during sentencing,222 enacting misdemeanor and low-level felony
statutes,223
or
individualizing
punishment
based
on
224
blameworthiness.
Increasing the severity of punishment could have
a strong expressive effect, signaling the law’s moral condemnation of
prosocially motivated fraud. Lowered sanctions, on the other hand,
could reflect the law’s recognition of the non-deliberative components
of prosocial fraud and would bring legal sanctions in harmony with
social sanctions and internal motivation.
But there are several reasons that adjusting sanctions may not have
the intended effect. First, prosocial fraud is often not the product of
220 Nina Mazar et al., The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept
Maintenance, 45 J. MKTG. RSCH. 633, 636 (2008). Of course, the religious context of the
Ten Commandments would pose substantial barriers to any effort to mandate use of this
trigger.
221 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 154, at 1881.
222 See Hessick, supra note 30, at 91–92.
223 See Baer, supra note 155, at 232.
224 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring
Punishment, 112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 429 (2013).
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conscious and deliberative decision-making. Individuals do not always
engage in a rational cost-benefit analysis, weighing the potential gains
from fraudulent activity against the probability of getting caught,
multiplied by the anticipated punishment.225 Considerable research has
shown that this concept of intent does not comport with a large portion
of fraudulent and unethical behavior. In many cases, people respond
instinctively and emotionally to the needs of those around them and do
not make a deliberate choice to engage in wrongdoing.226 In fact, they
often lack awareness that they are doing anything wrong. They “do not
think of themselves as wrongdoers whose behavior is punishable.”227
Second, prosocial fraud presents a case study of behavior that does
not respond properly to incentives. Fear of criminal prosecution should
serve as a powerful deterrent to fraudulent behavior, but fraud
continues to be endemic and ubiquitous. This suggests that the current
framework does not adequately capture how and why individuals
engage in fraudulent behavior. Indeed, “factual data on which a
deterrent system must be founded do not exist. Reliable findings about
the marginal general deterrent effects of various types and levels of
penalty for various crimes are hard to find.”228 Most studies indicate
that increasing penalties for wrongdoing has only a marginally
deterrent effect.229 Dishonest behavior does not appear to change when
the magnitude of stakes or consequences are altered.230 Only about 20
percent of the population lie fully and consistently when it is in their
material self-interests.231 About 39 percent remain honest and resist
monetary incentives to lie, and 20 percent of individuals lie partially—
that is, they do not tell the truth, but they also do not lie maximally.
These results have remained constant across experiments.232
Moreover, imposing sanctions can alter an individual’s decision
frame from an ethical to a business one, reducing overall levels of
cooperation.233 In one study, participants playing the role of
manufacturers reached a voluntary agreement to limit toxic emissions.

225 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 176 (1968).
226 See FELDMAN, supra note 6, at 40.
227 FELDMAN, supra note 6, at 153.
228 See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 64, 76 (4th ed. 2005).
229 See FELDMAN, supra note 6, at 153.
230 See Urs Fischbacher & Franziska Föllmi-Heusi, Lies in Disguise—An Experimental
Study on Cheating, 11 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 525, 542–43 (2013).
231 Id. at 527.
232 Id.
233 See Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Ethics, Deception, and Legal Negotiation, 20 NEV.
L.J. 1209, 1247 (2020); see also Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 234, at 684.
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Counterintuitively, participants who faced monitoring and modest fines
cheated more than those who faced no sanctions.234 In another study,
the introduction of a fine in Israeli day-care centers increased the
incidence of tardy parent pick-ups, an outcome that did not change
when the fine was removed.235 Similar results have been found with
studies of taxpayer compliance, where appeals to conscience were more
effective than the threat of sanctions.236 The introduction of sanctions
can change individuals’ perception of the social context, replacing moral
considerations with economic ones.237 Hence, sanctions, even small
ones—can crowd out intrinsic motivation.238 In addition, sanctions may
be perceived as a sign that noncompliance is widespread, undermine
individuals’ sense of autonomy, and frustrate a desire to signal
altruism.239 Finally, numerous studies have shown that individuals have
little knowledge of legal penalties, and their perceptions of the severity
of punishment or the likelihood of getting caught have little impact on
behavior.240
B. Enforcement
Given the limited effectiveness of legal and social sanctions, this
subpart explores the relative merits of different approaches to ex ante
private enforcement. Because prosocial fraud is particularly difficult to
detect and prosecute, supplemental private enforcement is necessary to
counteract the problems of definitional ambiguity, incrementalism, and
third-party complicity. What form should this private enforcement
take? Existing mechanisms prohibit, authorize, or mandate particular
action. First, the law may prohibit third parties from participating in
fraud. One example is aiding and abetting liability, whereby one who
aids another in committing fraud can be found guilty of the crime.
Second, the law may authorize third parties to take action, as in the case
of qui tam lawsuits. Finally, the law may mandate an affirmative duty,
such as whistleblowing duties or gatekeeping liability. This Part
compares and assesses several private enforcement mechanisms in the
context of prosocial fraud: (1) private causes of action; (2)

234 See Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames,
and Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 684, 694-96 (1999).
235 See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (2000).
236 See Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L REV. 274,
298–99 (1967).
237 See FELDMAN, supra note 6, at 65.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 64–65.
240 Id. at 69.
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whistleblowing duties; (3) traditional fraud gatekeepers; and (4)
alternative fraud gatekeepers.
1. Private Causes of Action
One means of enlisting third-party monitors is to authorize third
parties to bring suit. Authorization may be statutory, as in the case of
the Sherman Act, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) Act, and the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. The False Claims
Act (FCA), which targets fraud by government contractors, represents
another type of statutory authorization—the qui tam action. Qui tam
actions involve private parties (“relators”) bringing suit on behalf of the
government to rectify public wrongs.241 Other private causes of action
are judicially implied, such as private antifraud suits under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act.
There are several reasons why private rights of action are not an
effective means of curbing prosocial fraud. Although private parties can
more effectively detect and monitor instances of small-scale fraud, they
are constrained by the same types of limitations that afflict government
actors. While incentives to bring suit exist—for instance, the ability to
recoup a portion of the recovery—the impulse to do nothing is all too
compelling. Collective action problems hamper the willingness to bring
suit, as the cost of bringing a lawsuit is typically greater than the
plaintiff’s pro rata benefit.242 Given the morally ambiguous nature of
prosocial fraud, the disincentive to sue takes on increased salience.
Empathy for the prosocially motivated perpetrator and ambivalence as
to the culpability of the act further contribute to the default of inaction.
At the other extreme, private rights of action can sometimes result in
excessive and inefficient enforcement that drains judicial resources and
strains overburdened defendants.243 The securities fraud class action is
a prototypical example of private rights of action that have resulted in a
surfeit of frivolous suits.244

241 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 99 (2005).
242 See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 55 (1991).
243 See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1974); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental
Divergence Between the Private and Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 575, 577–78 (1997).
244 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534 (2006).
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2. Whistleblowing
A related mechanism of private enforcement—whistleblowing—
involves a statutorily imposed duty on third parties to disclose
misconduct. A whistleblower is “[a]n employee who reports employer
wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement agency.”245 The
definition has since expanded to include “other person[s] in a
contractual relationship with a company who report[] misconduct to
outside firms or institutions.”246 Some well-known whistleblower
provisions include those contained in the False Claims Act (FCA),
Whistleblower Protection Act,247 the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, Surface Transportation Assistance Act, Federal Railroad Safety Act,
and Sarbanes-Oxley Act.248 Whistleblowing statutes seek to incentivize
third parties to disclose misconduct through monetary rewards and
protection from retaliation. For instance, the FCA imposes liability on
individuals and companies who defraud the federal government.249
Whistleblowers must be made whole, which would include
“reinstatement with the same seniority status” that the employee
“would have had but for the discrimination, 2 times the amount of back
pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for any special damages
sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs and
reasonable attorneys’ fees.”250
Some evidence exists that these safeguards and incentives have
had their intended effect. For the fiscal year ending September 2019, of
the over $3 billion recovered for fraud and false claims under the False
Claims Act, over $2.1 billion, or 70 percent, was recovered in cases
initiated by whistleblowers.251
The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) “has awarded over $500 million to 83 individuals
since issuing its first award in 2012.”252 Whistleblowers qualify for
awards when they provide “original, timely and credible information
Whistleblower, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1903 (2007).
247 See id. at 1904–05.
248 See OSHA Fact Sheet: OSHA’s Whistleblower Protection Program, OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/OSHA3638.pdf.
249 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
250 Id. at § 3730(h)(2).
251 See Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in
Fiscal Year 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019.
252 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Awards Record Payout of Nearly $50
Million to Whistleblower (June 4, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/
2020-126.
245
246
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that leads to a successful enforcement action.”253 The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”)
protects the confidentiality of whistleblowers and grants awards
ranging from 10 to 30 percent of the funds collected when monetary
sanctions exceed $1 million.254 Prohibitions against retaliation include
protection against discharge, demotion, suspension, harassment, or
adverse consequences in the terms and conditions of employment.255
The Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the SEC to take action against employers
who retaliate against whistleblowers. It also creates a private right of
action that allows whistleblowers to sue their employers in federal
court and seek double back pay with interest, reinstatement, reasonable
attorneys’ fees, and reimbursement for certain costs.256
Despite such protections, whistleblowing suffers from inherent
limitations. First, whistleblowing accounts for a relatively small fraction
of fraud that is uncovered.
For instance, according to the
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2018 Global Economic Crime and Fraud
Survey, whistleblowing hotlines accounted for 7 percent of total
detected fraud and internal and external tip-offs accounted for 20
percent.257 By contrast, corporate controls detected 52 percent of
frauds, law enforcement uncovered 4 percent, and 8 percent were
discovered by accident.258 Second, only a small fraction of cases results
in awards. Although civil recoveries for fraud under the FCA totaled
over $2.1 billion for the fiscal year ending September 2019,259
approximately 80 percent of cases filed under it resulted in no
reward.260 Similarly, although the SEC’s whistleblower program has
awarded approximately $387 million since its inception, those rewards
have gone to only sixty-seven individuals. By comparison, the
Commission received over 5200 whistleblower tips in fiscal year 2019
See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Record $114 Million
Whistleblower Award (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/
2020-266.
254 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841, 1842, 1846 (2010).
255 See id. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1845.
256 See id. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1846.
257 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PULLING FRAUD OUT OF THE SHADOWS: GLOBAL ECONOMIC
CRIME AND FRAUD SURVEY 26 (2018), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/news-room/docs/
pwc-global-economic-crime-survey-report.pdf.
258 See id.
259 See Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion From False Claims Act Cases in
Fiscal Year 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019.
260 See Eric L. Young, Key Stats and Figures on Whistleblowing, MCELDREW YOUNG
PURTELL MERRITT (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.mceldrewyoung.com/whistleblowerstatistics/.
253
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alone.261 Third, although prohibited on the books, retaliation persists in
practice. According to a 2018 Ethics and Compliance Initiative Global
Business Ethics Survey, 44 percent of employees who reported
misconduct nevertheless reported being retaliated against.262
Retaliation was the most frequently filed complaint with the EEOC in
fiscal year 2019, at 53.8 percent of all charges filed.263 Congress directed
that agencies protect whistleblowers against retaliation, but the
Secretary of Labor has proven reluctant in litigating whistleblower
retaliation claims, leaving it to private parties to litigate amongst
themselves.264
In addition to these resource and enforcement limitations,
whistleblowing imposes psychological and emotional costs that are
more difficult to quantify.
Society continues to stigmatize
whistleblowers, referring to them derisively as “snitches” and
“rat[s].”265 Whistleblowers are often treated with disdain and contempt,
and all too often “become targets of harassment, intimidation . . . [and]
persecution.”266 Working with regulators is often seen as a betrayal of
one’s colleagues and clients. Those who are discovered experience
difficulties attracting business or finding alternative employment.267 As
a case in point, Pav Gill—Wirecard’s whistleblower who exposed one of
Europe’s biggest corporate frauds—was presented with a choice of
resigning with a positive reference or being fired. Even after resigning,
he was targeted “professionally” and “emotionally,” given bad
references, and publicly attacked for having “malicious intent.”268 In a
later interview, Pav stated, “I don’t like the term whistleblower,
261 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM 1–2 (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2019-annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2019 ANNUAL REPORT].
262 See ETHICS & COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE, THE STATE OF ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE IN THE
WORKPLACE 9 (2018), https://mk0ecihomepagexcvllh.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018-ECI-GBES-State-of-Ethics-Compliance-in-Workplace.pdf.
263 This number reflects total retaliation statistics, not just against whistleblowers.
See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS (CHARGES FILED WITH EEOC) FY
1997 THROUGH FY 2019 (2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/charge-statisticscharges-filed-eeoc-fy-1997-through-fy-2019 (last visited Nov. 30, 2020).
264 See David Kwok, The Public Wrong of Whistleblower Retaliation, 69 HASTINGS L. J.
1225, 1227 (2018).
265 See Naseem Faqihi, Choosing Which Rule to Break First: An In-House Attorney
Whistleblower’s Choices After Discovering a Possible Federal Securities Law Violation, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 3341, 3351 (2014) (alteration in original).
266 ANGIE ASH, WHISTLEBLOWING AND ETHICS IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE 11 (2016).
267 See Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 797, 817 (2016).
268 Dan McCrum et al., Wirecard’s Reluctant Whistleblower Tells His Story: ‘They Tried
to Destroy Me,’ FIN. TIMES (May 19, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/1d74221e1321-4f8c-9ca9-a4371629f178.
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honestly. I think it has some stigma, or negative connotations attached
to it. It implies you are going against the company which is feeding you,
it involves a breach of trust.”269 Moreover, whistleblowing targets “have
a powerful incentive to withhold information from potential
whistleblowers and to refrain from transacting with anyone of suspect
loyalties.”270 The result is an erosion of trust that can undermine
compliance and enforcement efforts.
3. Traditional Fraud Gatekeepers
These drawbacks point to the comparative advantage of
gatekeeper liability regimes. Gatekeepers—attorneys, accountants,
credit rating agencies, investment bankers, and other intermediaries—
can disrupt misconduct by withholding cooperation.271 At least in
theory, they serve as “independent professionals who pledge their
reputational capital” in order “to protect the interests of dispersed
investors who cannot easily take collective action.”272
Unlike
whistleblowers, the law punishes gatekeepers for reneging on their
statutory obligations, rather than rewarding them for compliance.273
Reputational concerns also provide a powerful incentive for
gatekeepers to report wrongdoing. By certifying disclosures and
verifying the accuracy of representations made by their clients, they
have the power to screen out bad actors and correct informational
asymmetries.274
Yet in practice, gatekeepers can be as susceptible to the influence
of prosocial motives as primary violators. As the financial scandals of
the late 1990s and early 2000s demonstrated, gatekeepers all too often
acquiesce in misconduct, whether through active collaboration or
willful blindness. Take, for instance, the case of Arthur Andersen.
Although a “decline in business morality” and “infectious greed” have
often been cited for the firm’s downfall,275 less attention has been paid
to the influence of friendship, camaraderie, and loyalty. Close ties bound
many of Andersen’s auditors and Enron’s employees, who shared a floor

Id.
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 60 (1986).
271 See id. at 53–54.
272 John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302 (2004).
273 See Kraakman, supra note 270, at 60.
274 See id. at 58; see also Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 267, at 802.
275 See Coffee, supra note 272, at 302–03 (citations omitted).
269
270

LEE (DO NOT DELETE)

238

11/8/21 4:15 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:199

together in Enron tower.276 Anderson’s lead partner on its Enron
account, David Duncan, was good friends with Enron’s chief accounting
officer, Rick Causey, a former Andersen audit manager. Interviews with
former employees of the two firms revealed a symbiotic relationship:
Many of Andersen and Enron’s top number crunchers took
annual golf vacations together, making friendly bets on each
round. They went on ski outings, schussing down the slopes
together. Others would sneak away from the office for Astros
games at Enron Field and take turns buying margaritas at
Mama Ninfa’s, a local Mexican restaurant chain. They played
fantasy football against each other over the office
computers.277
Andersen routinely signed off on Enron’s use of off-balance-sheet
partnerships to conceal debt and inflate profits. Even after concerns
began to rise and Enron’s shares plummeted, Duncan and his team
remained loyal to Enron, shredding more than a ton of documents and
deleting roughly 30,000 emails and computer files.278
The interlocking web of personal relationships that characterize
many business partnerships create conditions ripe for gatekeeper
complicity in fraud. Stories such as Andersen’s are all too common. A
similar dynamic was at play between WorldCom and its investment
bank, Salomon Smith Barney, Citigroup’s brokerage unit. WorldCom’s
Bernie Ebbers and Jack Grubman, a star Salomon Smith Barney
telecommunications analyst, shared a close relationship. Grubman
boasted of attending Ebbers’ wedding in 1999 and became part of his
inner circle, routinely attending WorldCom board meetings.279 In
addition to aggressively promoting WorldCom’s stock and lending
Ebbers vast sums of money, Salomon granted both Ebbers and
WorldCom CFO Scott Sullivan privileged IPO allocations, with Ebbers

276 See Flynn McRoberts, Ties to Enron Blinded Andersen, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 3, 2002, 2:00
AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-0209030210sep03-story.html.
277 Id.
278 See id.; see also Susanne Craig & Charles Gasparino, Ex-Broker Says Salomon Gave
IPOs to CEOs to Win Business, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2002, 12:54 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB1026958035301738840.
279 See The WorldCom-Wall Street Connection, FRONTLINE: THE WALL STREET FIX,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/wcom/cron.html (last
visited July 29, 2021); James P. Miller, WorldCom Exec Faults Andersen, CHI. TRIB. (July 9,
2002), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2002-07-09-0207090072-story
.html; Gretchen Morgenson, Market Watch; More Clouds Over Citigroup in its Dealings
with Ebbers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/03/business/market-watch-more-clouds-over-citigroup-in-its-dealings-with-ebbers.html.
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pocketing $11 million in profits over a four-year period on shares
received from Salomon.280
Regulators targeted these and other conflicts of interest between
gatekeepers and their clients in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,281 the
Dodd-Frank Act,282 and numerous agency regulations.283 Firms have
also implemented various self-regulatory solutions, such as erecting so
called “Chinese walls”—virtual information barriers to structurally
isolate individuals with privileged information and separate units with
conflicts of interest.284
Although these reforms may have addressed some of the more
egregious abuses, gatekeeper complicity in fraud has stubbornly
persisted. For instance, in March 2018, the SEC charged Merrill Lynch
with failure to properly perform its gatekeeping duties in the
unregistered sales of nearly $38 million in securities of Longtop
Financial Technological Limited (“Longtop”).285 Merrill allegedly
ignored numerous red flags indicating that the sales could be part of an
unlawful unregistered distribution, including an online report that
accused Longtop of financial fraud.286 Similarly, in October 2016, the
SEC charged Ernst & Young (“E&Y”) with failing to question numerous
suspicious tax adjustments in its audit of Weatherford International.287
E&Y also violated auditor independence requirements, including
“excessively friendly” relations between the E&Y partner and Chief
Financial Officer of the client, such as “taking frequent, overnight out-ofSee The WorldCom-Wall Street Connection, FRONTLINE: THE WALL STREET FIX,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/wallstreet/wcom/cron.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2021).
281 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 747 (2002)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201).
282 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301).
283 See, e.g., FINRA RULE 2241(c)(4)(i) (requiring firms to disclose “any other material
conflict of interest of the research analyst or member that the research analyst or an
associated person of the member with the ability to influence the content of a research
report knows or has reason to know at the time of the publication or distribution of a
research report”); FINRA RULE 2242(c)(4)(H) (requiring disclosure of conflicts of
interest with respect to debt research analysts and research reports).
284 See, e.g., H. Nejat Seyhun, Insider Trading and the Effectiveness of Chinese Walls in
Securities Firms, 4 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 369, 392–93 (2008).
285 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Merrill Lynch Charged with Gatekeeping
Failures in the Unregistered Sales of Securities (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press-release/2018-32.
286 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10,465,
Exchange Act Release No. 82,826 (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10465.pdf.
287 Ernst & Young LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 78,872 (Sept. 19, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/34-78872.pdf.
280
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town trips,” attending sporting events, and socializing “to an excessive
degree.’”288 Attorneys have fared no better. For instance, in December
2020, the SEC filed an enforcement action against Richard J. Rubin and
Thomas J. Craft alleging that over a three-year period, they submitted
fraudulent attorney opinion letters in connection with registering
securities for sale to the public.289 Attorneys routinely advise clients
engaged in corporate fraud and fail to report such conduct.290 Indeed,
attorney whistleblower provisions instituted pursuant to the SarbanesOxley Act and Dodd-Frank Act largely have gone unenforced.291
4. Alternative Fraud Gatekeepers
The limitations of relying on traditional fraud gatekeepers
highlight the need for alternative measures. Optimally, an effective
system of enforcement would leverage the resources of monitors who
are de facto external, independent, relatively unconstrained by resource
limitations, and excluded from existing social networks. Governmental
and quasi-governmental regulators, whistleblowers, and traditional
fraud gatekeepers are suboptimal on one or more of these dimensions.
Regulators are external and not embedded in intra-firm social networks,
but they are constrained by resource limitations and subject to capture
by the industries they regulate. As discussed above, whistleblowers
(both internal and external) and traditional fraud gatekeepers are often
so deeply embedded in networks of personal relationships that they are
anything but independent.
What type of monitor would be better positioned to divorce itself
of the personal networks that facilitate prosocially motivated fraud?
One intriguing possibility is the insurance industry. Fraud loss
insurance, also known as business crime insurance or commercial crime
insurance, provides coverage for losses due to employee dishonesty,
fraud, embezzlement, theft, robbery, forgery, computer fraud, or any
other business crime.292 Enlisting insurers as gatekeepers is not a new
concept. For instance, regulations promulgated under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 requires operators of hazardous
waste management facilities to purchase pollution liability insurance.293
Id.
See Craft, Exchange Act Release No. 88,280 (Feb. 25, 2020); Richard Jeffrey Rubin,
Exchange Act Release No. 88,258 (Feb. 21, 2020).
290 See Carliss N. Chatman, Myth of the Attorney Whistleblower, 72 SMU L. REV. 669,
722 (2019).
291 Id. at 672–73.
292 See, e.g., Crime, Theft & Fraud Insurance, ERIE INSURANCE, https://www.erieinsurance.com/business-insurance/crime (last visited July 29, 2021).
293 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.140–264.147 (2021).
288
289
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Similarly, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
requires employers to carry a type of insurance known as an ERISA
fidelity bond, which protects retirement plans from fraud or dishonesty
by the plan’s managers.294
The most obvious objection to greater use of insurers as monitors
is the problem of moral hazard—that is, the danger that when
individuals are insured against risk, it reduces their incentive to avoid
that risk. Under this view, by transferring the risk of loss to an insurer,
individuals do not internalize the costs of risky behavior, making them
more likely to engage in that behavior.295 For instance, one well-known
study found that police departments carrying liability insurance were
less likely to adopt best practices on the use of force or to take corrective
actions against problematic officers.296 A vast literature catalogues the
dangers of moral hazard and will not be reproduced here. My aim in this
subpart is not to advocate for the use of fraud loss insurance or any
variant thereof; it is simply to explore the potential of insurance as an
alternative avenue of private monitoring.
A growing body of literature has studied the insurance industry’s
ability to regulate behavior notwithstanding the perils of moral
hazard.297 Insurance companies have a litany of tools available to
protect against moral hazard and manage risk, including premium
differentials, deductibles, coinsurance, exclusions, and experience
ratings.298 A deductible involves a certain amount of expense being
excluded from coverage. Coinsurance involves requiring the insured to
pay part of each dollar of cost.299 By imposing part of the cost on
insureds, they—at least theoretically—would be incentivized to prevent
harms. Because insurers can lower payouts and increase profits by
lowering risk, insurers have a financial incentive to implement loss

See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.412-1, 2580 (2021).
See Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV.
531, 535 (1968); Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 238–
39 (1996).
296 See CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE CREATION OF
THE LEGALISTIC STATE 134–35 (2009).
297 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability
Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem, 36 RAND J. ECON. 63, 63–64 (2005);
Haitao Yin et al., Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance
Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 325, 326 (2011).
298 See Pauly, supra note 295, at 535; see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue,
Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 199
(2012).
299 See Pauly, supra note 295, at 535 n.4.
294
295

LEE (DO NOT DELETE)

242

11/8/21 4:15 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:199

prevention measures.300 Insurers who lower risk can offer lower
premiums and attract more customers. By managing risk, they can
influence policies, practices, and procedures that in turn impact
behavior.301 Despite the dangers of moral hazard, insurers may be
better positioned than government regulators and traditional fraud
gatekeepers to counteract those aspects of prosocial fraud that have
rendered it such an elusive regulatory target—definitional ambiguity,
incrementalism, and third-party complicity.
i. Definitional Ambiguity
Insurers may be better equipped than government monitors to
translate ambiguous standards into more rule-like requirements. First,
their policy-making process is often far more flexible than the types of
lawmaking processes available to the government. Governments
require legislative majorities or burdensome administrative rulemaking
processes, such as the federal notice-and-comment rulemaking
process.302
Moreover, when governments promulgate rule-like
requirements, those requirements remain static until revised through
future legislation or administrative process. By contrast, insurers can
promulgate and revise their policy requirements either by fiat,
assuming clients accept the revisions, or by negotiation. In those
negotiations, insurers and clients have at least three items to
negotiate—the content of the policy requirements, the price at which
the insurance policy is sold, and the amount of coverage provided by the
policy. These multiple targets of negotiation make it more likely that
negotiation will be successful; an objection to a particular policy, for
example, can be accommodated through concession on price or amount
of coverage.
Second, when rule-like policy requirements are violated, insurers
have penalties at their disposal that are not available to government
actors.303 Available sanctions include raising the price at which a policy
is renewed, raising premiums, or dropping coverage entirely. The
organization suffers higher costs for failing to monitor its employees
and in turn, the organization can discipline or terminate problematic
employees. These private remedies have the advantage of being easier
to enforce than criminal prohibitions, which can entail trial by jury and
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the sanctions imposed by an
See John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1539, 1543 (2017).
301 See id. at 1549, 1553.
302 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553.
303 An exception to this could be when government itself is functioning as an insurer.
300
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insurer do not include the possibility of imprisonment, the stakes are
also lower.
Third, insurers have greater flexibility than governments to tailor
their policies to individual circumstances or industries. Government
actors typically face pressure for equal treatment that limits their ability
to tailor legal requirements. An agency regulating an entire industry can
tailor at the industry level, but would face resistance to tailoring its
policies to individual companies or groups of companies.304 An agency
regulating multiple industries, or differently-situated actors within a
single industry, will have more difficulty tailoring legal requirements
even at an industry level. Insurers are unlikely to face these pressures
at the same level. Dissatisfied clients would always have the option of
seeking alternative coverage if they feel they have been treated
unfairly.305
These advantages have already been leveraged to privately
regulate public action. Take, for instance, police liability insurance:
municipalities now routinely purchase insurance to indemnify
themselves in the event they are sued for common law and
constitutional torts committed by their police officers.306 Because
insurers benefit from risk reduction measures taken by insureds after a
policy is issued, insurers have an incentive to reduce risk. By translating
vague governmental standards into rule-like requirements, insurers
provide the insureds with concrete standards of conduct. They have
done so by implementing detailed policies; distributing educational
literature, such as newsletters, white papers, and emails; and
conducting workshops with training resources.307
For instance, insurers have taken the notoriously abstract Fourth
Amendment excessive force doctrine and specified what degree of force
to use in different scenarios according to a “use-of-force continuum.”308
After the Supreme Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to
strip searches of imprisoned detainees in Florence v. Board of Chosen
304 Congress requires some agencies—like the Food and Drug Administration—
provide specific guidance, and sometimes differing legal requirements for smaller
businesses. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 350g (requiring FDA to promulgate certain regulations
in a manner that “provide[s] sufficient flexibility to be practicable for all sizes and types
of facilities, including small businesses”); FDA, Small Business Assistance,
https://www.fda.gov/industry/small-business-assistance (last updated Sept. 28, 2020_
(providing information on various FDA programs intended to assist small businesses in
regulatory compliance). But this is the exception rather than the rule.
305 This option, of course, will have some moderating incentive on the impact of any
insurance industry efforts to increase the rigor of their policies.
306 See Rappaport, supra note 300, at 1542.
307 Id. at 1576–77.
308 See id. at 1579–80.
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Freeholders, one major reinsurer clarified that a reasonable search
“should be conducted in a professional manner using a searcher of the
same sex, conducted without physical contact under sanitary
conditions, and done with a degree of privacy.”309
Similarly, insurers have translated the general “due care” standard
in tort law into particularized safety measures and rules.310 A network
of insurance claim adjusters and other agents follow uniform guidelines
developed with the help of legal experts.311 They make use of rule-like
requirements for ascertaining fault, causation, and loss.312 They also
impose safety standards that are stricter than standards required by the
government. Environmental liability insurers, for instance, either
require or offer premium discounts for implementation of private safety
codes that exceed government standards.313 In the realm of traffic
safety, insurers operationalize the duty of reasonable care into formulas
and “mechanical presumptions,” such as the presumption of liability for
rear-end collisions.314
ii. Incrementalism
In addition, insurers may be better positioned to detect
incremental changes in behavior. Insurers often have access to detailed
data about the industries they regulate. In the process of underwriting,
they acquire and process vast amounts of information about their
insureds. They are in the business of acquiring, sorting, and evaluating
complex and sophisticated information. They use this data to assess and
price the impact of different precautions and to generate detailed
policies with tiered, differentiated premiums that correlate with
different levels of risk.315 Insurers, after all, cannot operate profitably
unless they can make accurate actuarial determinations on which to
price their policies. Ex post, insurers operate vast networks of adjustors
who investigate, compute, and negotiate claims using standardized
charts and tables to quantify nonpecuniary losses.316
Moreover, clients may be more willing to provide information to
their insurers than to governments. Disclosure of information to
governments is complicated by the desire of companies to maintain
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316

See id. at 1580.
See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 298, at 234.
See id.
See id. at 214.
See id. at 211.
See id. at 235.
See Rappaport, supra note 300, at 1589.
See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 298, at 213.
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trade secrets. While there are typically trade-secret exceptions to
freedom of information laws,317 companies cannot always be confident
that agency FOIA officers or courts will agree with their view of what is
protected information. In at least some circumstances, companies may
be more willing to disclose information to insurers under contractual
confidentiality provisions than to governments.
Insurers’ expertise in minutiae and incremental change could
easily be leveraged to tackle incremental dishonesty. Insurers not only
have the infrastructure to detect low-level cheating, but also can
regulate conduct that is too de minimis to trigger legal sanctions.
Insurers have proven adept at regulating in the interstices of law, often
imposing standards of conduct that are higher than what the law
requires. Dishonesty is not illegal, and fraud results in liability only
when intent to deceive, reliance, and loss can be proven. But insurers
have tools at their disposal that go beyond what is available to
governmental actors. For instance, insurers impose harsh sanctions on
individuals who misrepresent information on their insurance
applications. These sanctions can range from increased premiums to
loss of coverage, fines, and other penalties. The threat of enforcement
is real, as insurers employ a vast network of claims adjusters and other
representatives to monitor compliance with various government and
insurer-imposed guidelines and rules.318
iii. Third-Party Complicity
Finally, insurers could be better positioned than governmental
regulators or traditional fraud gatekeepers to address the problem of
third-party complicity. The insurance industry has long suffered from a
negative public perception problem: insurers are often reviled as greedy
automatons intent on maximizing profits by finding pretexts to avoid
paying legitimate claims.319 A study commissioned by the American
Association for Justice found that insurance companies routinely go to
extreme lengths to avoid paying claims, including lying, forging
signatures, and altering reports. Although publicly traded insurance
companies have an obligation to seek a return for their shareholders,
this duty to shareholders often comes at the expense of policyholders.
In some situations, when policyholders file a claim, those policyholders
See The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 298, at 237.
319 See The Ten Worst Insurance Companies in America: How They Raise Premiums,
Deny Claims, and Refuse Insurance to Those Who Need It Most, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST.,
https://www.decof.com/documents/the-ten-worst-insurance-companies.pdf
(last
visited July 29, 2021).
317
318
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who do not accept initial lowball offers receive what is known as the
“boxing gloves” strategy: deny, delay, and defend.320 Distrust of the
insurance industry has also been fueled by corporate scandals involving
bid rigging, price-fixing, collusion, and improper accounting methods.321
For instance, in 2004, New York filed a civil suit against Marsh &
McLennan, the world’s largest insurance broker, for rigging bids and
steering business to insurers that paid it the largest incentives, known
as “contingent commissions.” In 2006, AIG, the world’s largest insurer,
paid over $1.6 billion to settle charges of improper accounting, bid
rigging, securities fraud, and improper practices involving workers’
compensation funds.322
Paradoxically, the mix of contempt, revulsion, and distrust of
insurance agents and the insurance industry more generally could be an
asset in combatting prosocial fraud. The social bonds and social
networks that bind individuals and their monitors necessarily hinders
effective monitoring of prosocial fraud. Enlisting monitors who are not
only external, but also distrusted and disliked, could render them more
effective monitors. When combined with existing conflicts-of-interest
laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which regulates the role of
gatekeepers more generally, insurers’ independence could be further
bolstered.
The emergence of insurers as private monitors of fraudulent
activity holds at least some promise. Insurers have the resources,
infrastructure, expertise, and incentives to assist in policing prosocial
fraud. They have demonstrated an ability to change behavior in such
diverse fields as police liability, consumer protection, traffic, workplace,
and food safety, among others. Desocializing fraud and stripping it of
the emotional and social ties that have heretofore hindered robust
enforcement could be a potentially fruitful avenue. But the dangers of
moral hazard are real, and the enlistment of private insurers is no
panacea. Other strategies to counteract the problem of prosocial fraud
include enhancing private aiding and abetting liability, implementing
greater education and transparency initiatives, and decreasing the
costliness of accountability. More systematic and robust enforcement

See id. at 3.
See Henri-Claude de Bettignies et al., The Insurance Business and Its Image in
Society: Traditional Issues and New Challenges 29 (INSEAD, Working Paper Series,
2006/28/ABCM),
https://sites.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=
2016.
322 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, AIG to Pay $800 Million to Settle
Securities Fraud Charges by SEC (Feb. 9, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2006-19.htm.
320
321
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of whistleblower retaliation laws may be a means of shifting the social
stigma of whistleblowing and decreasing the costs of accountability.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to identify the problem of prosocial fraud
and explain the situational context in which it operates. The existing
legal framework is tailored toward one species of fraud—individualistic
fraud motivated by greed. But social science research has shown that
financial incentives and personal ethics, which stem from an individual’s
religious and family background, culture, education, and upbringing,
only forms part of the story. Prosocial fraud is embedded in structures
of social relations that are inadequately accounted for in the current
legal framework. Motives matter. A person’s intentions influence both
internal and external judgments of moral character. A person who
commits fraud to help others can more easily convince himself that he
has not acted wrongfully or against his moral precepts. The presence of
a beneficiary other than the self facilitates a rationalization process that
allows individuals to supplant one source of morality—honesty and
integrity—with another—kindness and benevolence.
This
rationalization process undermines the deterrent impact of legal
sanctions. The moral ambiguity of prosocial fraud, combined with
cognitive biases such as self-deception and motivated blindness, not
only provides an alternate source of intrinsic motivation, but also
weakens the operation of social sanctions.
The Article has suggested that the ends of the legal system may be
better attained not by increasing sanctions, but by exploring
supplemental mechanisms of ex ante private enforcement. We are all
capable of ethical lapses, whether in the commission of the offense or
through complicity in its propagation. A certain measure of humility,
combined with recognition that prosociality can operate in unexpected
ways, would be a necessary antecedent to crafting an effective solution.
Ultimately, the deterrent aims of the current doctrinal framework
cannot be fully achieved without an appreciation for—and accounting
of—the impact of social ties and social motives on fraudulent behavior.

